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Abstract 
 
The post-war reconstruction and state-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(BiH) has been complex, with priorities changing as the country gradually normalizes 
and donor interests evolve. In mid-2002 the international community in BiH began a 
significant effort to modernize and reform BiH’s education system to better prepare 
the country’s youth to play productive social, economic and political roles in the fu-
ture. Although educational reform gained significant attention in 2002, reforms efforts 
have been occurring at a variety of levels since 1996. 
 
This paper will provide an overall review of the state of education and educational 
reform in BiH. In the first part of the paper, a conceptual framework is developed to 
provide a basis for understanding the role of education and educational reform in so-
cieties undergoing a period of transition. Next, the state of education in BiH is re-
viewed, with a focus on needed reforms. BiH’s post-war social, political and legal 
environments are reviewed to clarify the challenges facing reformers. In order to pro-
vide a case study of reform in a post-conflict country, the second half of the paper 
reviews various reform efforts that have been proposed and implemented since 1996, 
with an emphasis on the reform process and the role of the international community. 
Special attention is given to efforts organized by the Office of the High Representa-
tive, the European Commission and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe. In addition, the unique experience of the Brčko district is reviewed to deter-
mine whether it might serve as a model for reform across BiH. Throughout this re-
view there is an emphasis on both process and outcome, because understanding these 
complex processes is crucial to understanding how and why reforms did or did not 
occur at various points in time. Several lessons learned for future reform in BiH and 
other societies in transition are offered in the hope that future reform processes might 
be more effective and efficient based on BiH’s experience. Finally, suggestions for 
future research are proposed as education and educational reform in BiH and other 
post-conflict, transition societies, are complex yet necessary efforts to ensure long-
term peace and stability. 
 
* * * 
 
Research for this paper proceeded throughout 2002 and 2003, with initial versions 
prepared in March and May 2003, and final revisions made in early September. There 
have been many developments from March through September 2003, which has made 
keeping this document current a challenge. The author regrets any failures to ade-
quately update all sections to reflect the rapidly changing environment. The author 
may be contacted directly with questions, suggestions or comments at 
valeryperry@yahoo.com. 
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I. Introduction 
A country’s educational system is perhaps its single most important social, economic 
and political resource. Schools educate youth for future employment, socialize chil-
dren to ensure integration and active involvement in their communities, prepare them 
for productive participation as a citizen of their country and transmit those values and 
beliefs deemed to be important by their society. The far-reaching impact of an educa-
tional system explains its centrality in the domestic politics of many nations – democ-
ratic or otherwise. It also illustrates the difficulties inherent in rebuilding or reforming 
an educational system in the aftermath of violent conflict, whether by actors who were 
themselves party to the conflict, or by outside third-party actors who become involved 
in educational work as a part of a greater post-conflict development effort. 
 
As part of the post-war reconstruction process initiated by the signing of the Dayton 
Peace Accords (DPA, or General Framework Agreement for Peace, GFAP) in De-
cember 1995, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) is undergoing a period of educational 
reform and modernization at all levels: primary and secondary; university and voca-
tional; compulsory and elective. While reform efforts began with initial inflows of 
money and assistance in early 1996, coordinated and targeted programmes did not 
begin until later, culminating in a full-scale effort organized through the Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in mid-2002. In the years immedi-
ately following the signing of the DPA, educational reform was not a priority of the 
international community (IC) or BiH authorities. The primary focus was initially on 
reforms and basic services that were vitally needed in the shattered country, such as 
reconstruction, separation of the military forces in BiH, refugee return, and basic in-
frastructure development. There was also an emphasis on elections, which the IC 
viewed as a critical part of an early exit strategy. Although briefly mentioned in An-
nex 6,1 the IC’s mandate primarily focused on implementation of the peace agree-
ment, in which education is not a top priority. This is evidenced by the fact that no 
organization, international or domestic, was given a clear mandate to ensure educa-
tional reform. Therefore, issues such as military stabilization (Annex 1A), refugee 
                                      
1 Annex 6 provides for the “Agreement on Human Rights”, and Article I (Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms) point 12 notes “the right to education”. 
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return (Annex 7), elections (Annex 3), and police force restructuring (Annex 11) took 
the majority of attention (and resources) of the IC, as these were perceived to be the 
elements of reform most necessary to enable exit of the IC from its pseudo-
occupation.  
 
While the architects of the DPA may not have recognized or acknowledged the impor-
tance of education in BiH, it is difficult to underestimate the impact that a comprehen-
sive, modern and fair education system can have in developing a democratic state. In 
January 2002, at a conference on educational reform sponsored by the Office of the 
High Representative (OHR), the chief civilian peace implementation body in BiH, 
Principal Deputy High Representative Donald Hays acknowledged the failure of both 
the IC and domestic authorities to respond to this issue soon enough: “We are late in 
tackling this issue, one that should have been viewed as a core issue for BiH post-war 
recovery and an issue that will definitely influence the success or failure of all our 
efforts to create a free, democratic and stable BiH.”2 Few development, conflict reso-
lution, democratization or human rights experts would doubt the central role that edu-
cation can play in promoting these processes. This was reluctantly acknowledged by 
the US occupation force in post-World War II Germany as they tried to rebuild and 
reform the German education system: “To institute a democracy in Germany required 
more than the outward forms of popular governance. Free elections, democratic con-
stitutions, independent political parties, and local self-government were simply insti-
tutional features; they required an inner spirit to give them meaning.”3 The same 
statement can be applied to BiH. 
 
The story of educational reform efforts in this multiethnic, post-conflict, post-Cold 
War transitional society provides an interesting picture of an important aspect of de-
mocratization and state-building, and of the various roles that can, and possibly 
should, be played by internal and external actors. By asking (and attempting to an-
swer) the question, “What has been happening in terms of education in BiH in the past 
                                      
2  “PDHR Hays calls for urgent education reform.”OHR Press Release, 22 January 2002, at 
http://www.ohr.int. 
3 James F. Tent, Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Ger-
many. (Chicago, 1982), 1. 
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seven years since the end of the war?” this study will explore a variety of related is-
sues, including:  
· the challenges facing education in BiH  
· the state of educational reform in BiH 
· the roles and activities of BiH and IC authorities  
· the role of education in peace-building, minority-majority relations and inter-
communal reconciliation 
· potential lessons to be learned and best practices for other post-conflict or transi-
tional states 
· the role of education in democratization and state-building strategies 
As the US administration has begun to take steps to reform the education system in 
post-war Iraq, it is clear that there is a need for lessons learned from reform processes 
in other post-conflict and transition countries such as BiH.4  
 
There have been numerous agency reports, media stories and surveys of the education 
system in BiH. This study is intended to target those readers interested in several re-
lated angles, including a concise overview of educational activities in BiH from 1996 
to 2002, a case study of the role of the IC in state-building in BiH and a review of the 
negotiations and compromises that drive development and reform processes in general 
in post-Dayton BiH. Although education and educational reform encompass a range 
of activities, from pre-school to university education to ongoing adult education pro-
grammes, this review will focus on efforts to reform the compulsory primary and gen-
eral secondary educational programmes, while briefly noting reforms in other educa-
tional endeavours. Compulsory education, at the primary or secondary levels, can be 
viewed as the most political of educational reform efforts. This is not to say that the 
other efforts have not been politicized. Demobilized soldiers in need of vocational 
training can be manipulated by political parties, particularly before elections. Higher 
education and academia have been plagued by politics and intellectual and academic 
freedom has been compromised through attempts to exert political control over uni-
versities. However, the education and transmission of basic facts and values to a coun-
try’s youth is at the crux of both the identity-based conflicts that can occur and of the 
                                      
4 Jackie Spinner,  “Next: Operation Iraqi Education”, The Washington Post, 21 April 2003, at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A58486-2003Apr19.html. 
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intercommunal negotiations that are necessary in a multiethnic state. Researchers note 
that: “ethnic attitudes are formed early, and that once positive or negative prejudices 
are formed, they tend to increase with time. Early socialization experiences are, there-
fore, critical in the formation of ethnic attitudes.”5 A higher education or vocational 
system can be structured as modern and liberal, but if the students enter such a system 
from a dogmatic and politicized primary and secondary education, the foundation has 
already been established. 
 
The information gathered in this report comes from a compilation of primary and 
secondary sources, drawing heavily on agency reports from the variety of 
international organizations (IOs) working on education in BiH. Information was also 
gathered through interviews and discussions in 2002 and 2003 with representatives of 
the various implementing agencies (both IOs and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) and outside experts. The author participated in two of the European 
Commission Technical Assistance to Educational Reform Shared Modernization 
Strategy (EC-TAER SMS) workshops as a volunteer advisor to the working group on 
Integration of Returnee Children (SMS Working Group 4.3), attended several SMS 
support group meetings as an observer and participated in the OSCE-organized 
education forum meetings.  
 
This paper is organized into four general sections. First, a framework for analyzing 
the role of education and educational reform in societies undergoing a variety of po-
tential transitions is presented in order to provide a basis for understanding the chal-
lenges facing BiH. Second, the education system in BiH is reviewed with a focus on 
primary and secondary education. BiH’s pre-war system, the impact of the war on 
education from 1992 to 1995 and the post-war reform needs are also presented to il-
lustrate the broad need for modernization. Next, several of the reform efforts that have 
been initiated or supported by the IC are reviewed, with a focus on several of the larg-
est and most influential initiatives. Finally, lessons learned from the education reform 
effort in BiH are presented to provide suggestions for future innovations in BiH, or for 
other societies in transition and in need of educational reform or modernization. While 
                                      
5 Kenneth D. Bush and Diana Saltarelli, “The Two Faces of Education in Ethnic Conflict”, UNICEF  
(August 2000), 3. In reference to research by Padilla, Ruiz and Brand. 
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BiH, due to heavy international involvement, is often a very specific case study, its 
experiences can still offer lessons for intervention and state-building efforts in other 
regions. 
 
The debate on educational reform in BiH cannot be viewed in a vacuum. It is occur-
ring at a time when the IC is increasingly frustrated with the pace of change in BiH 
and is pre-occupied by other global imperatives. Additionally, the international donor 
aid community is experiencing donor ‘fatigue’ and reallocating its resources to ‘sex-
ier’ trouble-spots across the globe, as BiH politicians continue to fail to create and 
consolidate a vision of a state based on the premises of multiethnicity, equality and 
power-sharing. However, it is also occurring at a time when BiH’s human resources 
increasingly see more hope outside the borders of the fragile country than within, and 
where parents and children who desperately want a better education and future are 
uncertain whether it will be delivered. There is therefore little room for failure, as 
educational reform will, in the short and long-term, create a generation of citizens 
who will bear the burden of determining the future of BiH. 
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II. Reform at a Time of Multiple Transitions 
 BiH is in the unfortunate position of undergoing not one transition, but three: the 
post-Cold War transition from a one-party political system and a controlled economy 
to a multiparty, democratic, free market state; the post-war transition resulting from 
the violent dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; and the transi-
tion from a socialist state towards membership in the European Union (EU), including 
the integration of all of the human and minority rights protections that are necessary 
for future participation in European structures. Educational reform would be neces-
sary under any one of these transitions, but at the conflux of all three it becomes clear 
why it has been so difficult to achieve to date. This section will provide an overview 
of the issues, norms, themes and specific challenges facing any country undergoing 
any one of these transitions. Together, they provide a general framework for thinking 
about educational reform in BiH. 
 
A. Education in Multiethnic Societies 
The link between education and one’s identity has been well-established. Language, 
culture, history and worldview are all transmitted through both informal education in 
the home and formal education in school. Education is inextricably linked to the right 
to have, express, protect and promote one’s identity: “Next to the family, (education) 
is the single most important agency for cultural reproduction, socialization and iden-
tity formation.”6 Educational rights and unrestricted access are particularly important 
issues in the multiethnic, multilingual societies that dominate a Europe in which many 
groups demand full participation and representation in political, social and economic 
affairs. Therefore, to genuinely protect minority rights, education is one of the most 
critical areas of implementation.  
 
Over the past 50 years, numerous conventions, declarations and frameworks guaran-
teeing human rights and minority rights in general, and educational and cultural rights 
in particular, have been developed and ratified by countries across Europe and the 
world. The following list highlights some of the most significant: 
                                      
6 C.H. Williams, “The Cultural Rights of Minorities: Recognition and Implementation”, in J. Plitchtova 
(ed.), Minorities in Politics: Cultural and Language Rights (Bratislava, Slovakia, 1992). 
Cited in Kristin Henrard, “Education and Multiculturalism”, 7 International Journal on Minority and 
Group Rights (2000), 393-410. 
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· European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (adopted in 1950; entry into force 1953)  
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/CadreListeTraites.htm) 
· International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation (adopted and opened for signature in 1965; entry into force 1969) 
(http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_icerd.htm) 
· International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted and opened for 
signature in 1966; entry into force 1976) 
(http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm) 
· International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted and 
opened for signature in 1966; entry into force 1976) 
(http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_cescr.htm) 
· UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted and opened for signature 
in 1989; entry into force 1990) 
(http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm) 
· European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (adopted and opened 
for signature in 1992) 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/WhatYouWant.asp?NT=148) 
·       European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(adopted in 1995; entry into force 1998) 
(http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/157.htm) 
 
These and other agreements begin to define the relationship between a state’s obliga-
tions and an individual’s rights, entering into the complex and often controversial ter-
ritory governing the needs of a state for a cohesive citizenry and the rights of a family 
or national minority group for cultural protection and autonomy in their community 
affairs.  The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly and plainly states, 
“Everyone has the right to education”,7 and goes on to note more specific rights that 
form the basis of the relationship between national minorities and the state authorities: 
“Parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their 
children.”8 The 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child includes several comple-
                                      
7 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, Article 26, paragraph  1. 
8 Ibid., point 3. 
 
 
9
mentary principles: “[The child] shall be given an education which will promote his 
general culture and enable him, on a basis of equal opportunity, to develop his abili-
ties, his individual judgement, and his sense of moral and social responsibility, and to 
become a useful member of society.”9 
 
However, while progress is being made in accepting and implementing these protec-
tions, and while acknowledgement of these rights is an important first step, there is 
still significant room for improvement. For instance, there is discussion about whether 
these principles can be best fulfilled, both in letter and spirit, by policies that promote 
curricular modules targeted towards specific minority groups, or through a curriculum 
that aims to mainstream these issues into the overall educational approach. A report 
prepared by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities explored the issues 
of national minority educational and linguistic rights.10 In a questionnaire distributed 
in December 1996 to all of the OSCE participating states, one of the questions asked 
was, “To what extent is the culture, history, religion and belief of national minorities 
taught in the general curriculum?”11 The report notes that while the vast majority of 
states that responded to this question asserted that they do teach about one or more of 
their national minorities in the curriculum, 15 (including BiH) indicated that this 
teaching was not part of the general curriculum at either the primary or secondary 
school level: “Minority cultures were taught only to the members of the minorities.”12 
                                      
9 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, 1959, paragraph  7. Full text available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/25.htm. 
10 It should be noted that the HCNM report only concerned national minorities, and that in BiH, the 
three dominant factions are not considered to be national minorities. There is no single ‘titular nation’ 
in Bosnia, and there is no dominant majority. Before the war, Bosnia had a population of approxi-
mately 4.4 million people, which was about 45% Bosniak, 35% Serb, and 18% Croat. Rough estimates 
in 2000 suggest the breakdown is now 48% Bosniak, 39% Serbs, and 12% Croat. See Sumantra Bose, 
Bosnia After Dayton: Nationalist Partition and International Intervention (London, 2002), 45. The last 
census was held in 1991, and while an updated census is sorely needed, there has been no agreement on 
such a process as it would be highly charged politically. In the absence of a titular nationality, the Bos-
niaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs are each considered a ‘constituent people’ or  ‘constituent 
nation’ enjoying equal rights throughout the country.  The concept of  ‘constituent peoples’ has been 
used to codify the distinction between a ‘nation’and a  ‘national minority’ and to address the issues of 
belonging, identity and ownership in a country made up of several nations. In BiH today the three con-
stituent peoples are clearly not national minorities (BiH’s ‘real’ national minorities include Albanians, 
Czechs, Hungarians, Jews, Macedonians, Roma, Slovenes, Ukrainians and others) and the system en-
sures that as constituent peoples they enjoy some of the benefits of consociationalism, such as a na-
tional interest veto and proportional representation in many government bodies. 
11 OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, Report on the Linguistic Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National Minorities in the OSCE Area, March 1999, 24. 
12 OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, March 1999. Report on the Linguistic Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National Minorities in the OSCE Area, 25.  
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Sixteen states responded that they do have a programme to teach about national mi-
norities in the general curriculum.13 Further, some states responded that they teach 
courses about tolerance and intercultural understanding, either in addition to, or in 
place of specific courses on national minorities.  
 
In the analysis of these results, it is emphasized that “fewer than 1/3 of the states re-
sponded affirmatively that they teach about minority cultures in the general curricu-
lum.”14 In the conclusions and recommendations, the authors of the report suggest that 
all states must be more aware of international standards, and that states could be well-
served by legislation to ensure policy implementation. The authors also emphasize the 
need for close communication between government bodies and national minority 
communities to ensure effective implementation strategies that reflect community 
needs. 
 
Educational strategies in multiethnic states must address two key areas of either inclu-
sion or integration: linguistic and cultural rights. The language of instruction and the 
languages taught directly reflect the extent of minority participation. While no one 
would argue against the necessity of a strong education including math and science, 
whether these subjects are taught in a student’s potentially minority mother-tongue or 
some other dominant ‘official’ language can affect the quality of a student’s education 
and confer certain advantages on the native speakers of the majority tongue. Cultural 
rights include the basket of courses such as art, literature, music and history that re-
flects a people’s shared experience. These courses, subjective in nature, can prove 
controversial as they are potentially open to multiple perspectives and interpretations; 
there is no single cultural truth. Both aspects of education require appropriate legal 
protection and instructional methods to ensure equitable educational opportunity for 
all students.  
 
The issue of segregating national minority study modules into an elective designed to 
extend specific knowledge to a self-selected audience raises the issue of whether the 
                                      
13 Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia (particularly Baltic Germans), Germany (particularly 
Roma), Hungary, Kyrgystan, Lithuania (teaching about the Jews, Tatars and Karaites), Norway, Po-
land, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden (particularly Sami), Switzerland, Turkey and Turkmenistan. 
14 OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities.  Report on the Linguistic Rights of Persons 
Belonging to National Minorities in the OSCE Area, March 1999, 25. 
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purpose of these norms is simply to ensure access by national minorities to an educa-
tion that includes their own culture or to ensure the development of a society based on 
a tolerant and diverse citizenry. An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and De-
velopment (OECD) report published in September 2001 suggests that “education sys-
tems should not just be ‘fair’ to minorities – they should promote a spirit of equality 
and tolerance among ethnic and cultural groups.”15 In a report on minority rights in 
education in Estonia, Latvia, Romanian and Macedonia, it is similarly concluded that: 
“learning apart does not encourage living together”, and that “there is a danger of a 
strictly mono-lingual/mono-religious/mono-cultural or even mono-racial approach 
leading to ghettoization of minorities.”16 
 
Wealthy and stable democracies have continued to struggle with the best way to im-
plement these agreements throughout the past 60 years of peacetime development. 
The challenge to achieve such multiculturalism is complicated by situations in which 
cultural groups are, or perceive themselves to be excluded, marginalized or otherwise 
disenfranchised from the ‘mainstream’ society of the majority. The risk is cultural 
polarization and civil discontent, whether through latent dissatisfaction, low-level 
social criminal activity and unrest, or violent, politically driven conflict: “When these 
basic human needs – of identity, security, recognition, autonomy, participation, self-
esteem and a sense of justice - continue to be frustrated and remain unfulfilled then 
fears of the other (often exaggerated) and a culture of separation prevail(s).”17 The 
norms noted above provide a framework for how to begin to address these issues; 
successful implementation is dependent on creative and trusted approaches developed 
jointly by communities and the relevant educational authorities. 
 
                                      
15 OECD Centre for Co-operation with Non-members, Directorate for Education, Employment, Labour 
and Social Affairs, Education Committee. Thematic Review of National Policies for Education – Bos-
nia and Herzegovina. Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe Report, Table 1, Task Force on Educa-
tion, 27 September 2001, 15. 
16 Duncan Wilson, Minority Rights in Education: Lessons for the European Union from Estonia, Lat-
via, Romania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Right to Education Project (De-
cember 2002), 81.  
17 Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, “A Partnership Between Peace Education and Conflict Resolution: 
The Case of Cyprus”, at http:/ www.construct.haifa.ac.il/~cerpe/papers/mariaht.htm. 
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B. Education in Societies in Transition 
 The end of the Cold War introduced a new era in which the lid placed on develop-
ment and modernization by the Communist system was lifted, revealing a plethora of 
political, economic and social sectors ripe for reform. While several countries outside 
the Warsaw Pact have themselves been slow to replace authoritarian teaching methods 
with more interactive approaches, the need for reform in education was particularly 
evident in Eastern Europe, where advances in modern teaching methods, progressive 
curricula and problem-solving oriented pedagogy passed over the top-down, techni-
cally accurate, yet pedagogically weak education systems in the East. In line with a 
single-party system in which conformity was valued and challenges to the social order 
repressed, curricula and teaching methods were rigidly defined, ideologically-driven 
and highly centralized, with little room for innovation and no room for critical 
thought, analysis or reflection of the ideas presented. 
 
Three general areas of educational reform in these societies can be identified: le-
gal/legislative, technical/pedagogical and content/curricula. In terms of legislative 
reform, a key priority has been de-centralization of education, to allow for greater 
local-level input in educational affairs under a general framework of standards man-
dated by the state. In a workshop on the topic of education in multiethnic societies in 
Central and Eastern Europe, participants affirmed the need for a mix of centralized 
and de-centralized control and authority on the issue of education. Local authorities 
and experts are best poised to ensure that education reflects the needs of a local com-
munity, and can be most responsive to student and parent interests: “In turn, central 
authorities have a role to play in ensuring that education and minority rights are pro-
tected, which will, in turn, contribute to social cohesion.”18 Additionally, in the ab-
sence of a centralized, one-party state driven by a central ideology, particularly at the 
level of higher education, legislation is needed to ensure academic independence, ac-
countability, innovation and sound scholarship. Finally, while under the socialist re-
gime the issue of national minorities was subsumed under the banner of ultimate 
equality for all peoples, the adoption of pertinent legislation and appropriate imple-
                                      
18 Minority Rights Groups International, “Education in Multi-Ethnic Societies of Central and Eastern 
Europe”, at http:/www.minorityrights.org. 
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mentation strategies is needed to begin to address the educational needs of national 
minorities. 
 
The second set of reforms focuses on technical methods of teaching and the introduc-
tion of modern pedagogical techniques. In the previous system, a key educational ob-
jective was to develop a society of conformist citizens who would advance the goals 
of the party and the state. Rote-memorization of a specific set of mono-perspective 
facts took the place of a Socratic learning environment in which questions serve as the 
basis for analytical thought. Educators were the medium for the transmission of 
knowledge, rather than a facilitator of individual creative growth and development. 
While these traditional, authoritarian methods were not confined only to countries 
behind the Iron Curtain (classrooms and teaching approaches children in the United 
States in 2003 may take for granted are very different from the education their grand-
parents or even parents experienced), other countries in more liberal systems have 
been able to progressively modernize, experimenting with methods and techniques 
over time. As with all social reforms in the post-Cold War region, however, these 
changes are being made more rapidly, and often more as a result of external rather 
than internal impetus. 
 
In a post-Cold War economy where jobs are not guaranteed by the state and where 
students must be prepared for a demanding and fast-changing labour market, old 
teacher-centred approaches are no longer suitable and new student-centred teaching 
methods are needed. Pedagogy must be liberalized so that critical thinking can begin 
to enter the classroom. Students must possess a broad range of skills to ensure that 
their career potential is flexible, as ‘employment for life’ in a single state-owned in-
dustry is no longer available. As Europe becomes an increasingly integrated and uni-
fied continent, European countries must adopt homogenized standards to guarantee 
maximum mobility across educational systems (particularly institutions of higher 
learning) and labour markets.  
 
The third set of reforms, regarding curriculum and content, is possibly the most con-
troversial of the educational reforms in transition countries. The content taught to 
children, the facts they learn about their culture, the history of their country and the 
history of other (often neighbouring countries), will play a key part in shaping their 
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worldview and perceptions. Educating children about European development in the 
twentieth century has been particularly difficult and clearly illustrates the challenges 
educators face in addressing such reforms. The process of ‘recapturing history’ in the 
wake of the Cold War and the rapid social transformations of the twentieth century is 
a well known challenge: 
History and historians were particularly ill-served under the communist regimes. The 
recovery of erased or manipulated memories may be at the centre of the transforma-
tion and encourage the move towards democracy (the memory of 1956 in Hungary), 
or may in contrast justify the worst (battle of Kosovo). Most of the time, history and 
memory have been carried away in the maelstrom of transitions, appropriated by poli-
ticians.19 
 
All countries face these challenges, as the manipulation of history can be a tool for 
division, rather than tolerant enlightenment. It could even be said that at some level all 
countries adapting to the modernization of the twentieth century have been forced to 
face the issue of nationalism and education, with varying degrees of commitment and 
success. Again, the speed of reform and the social and political vacuums that often 
exist in societies in transition simply highlight this difficult process. For example, 
tensions between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvania continue amidst de-
mands for cultural and linguistic rights and claims of ethnic segregation in the wake 
of violence in the early 1990s.20  
 
History is both memory and identity, and education is a means of cultural identity 
preservation. This challenge has led to the development of initiatives such as the 
Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Research and various Council of 
Europe (COE) programmes.21 In its work on teaching history in the ‘New Europe’ the 
COE has recommended a history curricula that emphasizes shared and ‘transversal’ 
                                      
19 Jean-Yves Potel, “Political Manipulation of Memory and the Responsibilities of Historians (ab-
stract)”, presented at the symposium Rebuilding a Common Future: For a Critical Approach to History 
Teaching, 10-13 May 2000, Sarajevo. 
20 “New Tensions Between Romanians and Hungarians in Transylvanian City”, Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 16 April 2002, http://www.rferl.org/newsline/2002/04/4-See/see-
160402.asp. 
21 The issue of textbooks and interpretations of history have been heavily discussed. See the Georg 
Eckert Institute web site at http//www.gei.de and the South-East Europe Textbook Network at 
http://storch.gei.de/seenet/states/bih/history_after_the_war.htm. 
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themes that have affected the continent as a whole, such as feudalism, population 
movements or the industrial revolution.22 The difficulty often lies in finding the ap-
propriate balance between instilling pride in one’s culture, history and heritage, and 
honestly exploring the less positive aspects of national development. The COE further 
emphasizes the difference between ‘national’ and ‘nationalist’ histories, and encour-
ages a framework that does not just include political and military histories, but social 
and cultural history as well, including gender perspectives and the common human 
element of national development. In general, a multiple-perspective approach to learn-
ing is necessary to ensure children are equipped to analyze facts critically and inde-
pendently, particularly the ‘unquestionable truths’ that have dominated curricula for 
so long.   
 
This brief review of the challenges many countries in transition are facing provides a 
basic introduction to critical issues that must be addressed. Countries that have ex-
perienced relative success in making this difficult transition, such as Hungary, Poland 
and the Czech Republic, among others, can provide examples of best practices. How-
ever, they too are only at the beginning of a reform process that will take years to 
complete. The difficulties inherent in making these reforms in a peaceful state illus-
trate the even greater difficulties that countries must endure when they are proceeding 
through this reform in the wake of violent conflict. 
 
C. Education in Post-War Societies/Education in Peace-Building 
Education in times of war can be both a victim of, and a catalyst for the conflict. War 
obviously disrupts the educational process, as it does all patterns of normal life. De-
pending on how long a conflict lasts, an educational system must adapt in order to 
provide basic services to students.23 In a post-war environment, education can help to 
facilitate recovery and reconciliation and be a focal point for community redevelop-
ment. However, education can also be used as a tool in wartime or in the post-war 
environment to prolong or reignite the conflict and promote division and intolerance. 
                                      
22 Denis Durand de Bousingen, Lessons in History: The Council of Europe and the Teaching of His-
tory, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, April 1999, 20.  
23 The Interagency Network for Education in Emergencies provides resources and information to assist 
in the educational process in times of war. See http://www.ineesite.org. 
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This dual nature of the potential roles of education in peace and conflict – both the 
constructive and destructive – has been referred to as “the two faces of education”.24 
 
At its most basic, in a post-war environment, educational reform consists of the physi-
cal reconstruction of schools and education infrastructure, reconstitution of educators, 
(often a difficult task, as many former educators may have been killed or left the 
country during the war), and the burden of once again teaching routine subjects like 
math and science, with the anything-but-routine challenge of teaching history, art and 
culture through a fresh lens of violent conflict. Both consciously and subconsciously, 
war affects a person’s outlook, perceptions and worldview, and these reframed opin-
ions are then transmitted from adults to children, either informally at home or for-
mally in the schools. Contemporary history, as well as the history of centuries past, 
are suddenly all refocused through the lens of recent experience. 
 
This is clearly the case in BiH and the former Yugoslavia. Similarly, the region’s 
close European neighbours are undertaking the same process now that the post-Cold 
War transition has ushered in a new era focused on analyzing the continent’s past - 
inclusive of the violence of the twentieth century. Post-Cold War transition states and 
post-conflict states face similar challenges in addressing educational approaches to 
teaching history and culture, which is often at the core of educational debate in BiH.  
 
In Croatia, a moratorium was placed on the teaching of the history of the recent war in 
the Krajina, which is home to many Serbs. This history will be taught for the first time 
in the 2003 to 2004 school year, with a special textbook developed for approximately 
4,100 students of Serb nationality in the region.25 In Serbia, despite the fall of the re-
gime of Slobodan Milosević, textbooks continue to be very nationalist in their content 
and approach to recent history.26 While these offer examples of reactions to recent 
wars, memories can be long. There is an ongoing debate in China, Korea and Japan 
                                      
24 Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces…, vii. 
25 Drago Hedl, “Young Serbs Finally Start Studying the Controversial Events Surrounding the War of 
Independence”, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 432 Balkan Crisis Report, 23 May 2003. See 
http://www.iwpr.net/archive/bcr3/bcr3_200305_432_2_eng.txt. 
26 See Goran Tarlac, “History Revised: Post-Milosevic High School History Textbooks Still Offer 
Lessons in Nationalism”, Transitions Online, 24 June 2003. 
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regarding history textbooks chronicling Japan’s policies in the 1940s.27 In Cyprus, 
education is very obviously used as a tool to promote the conflict on the divided is-
land: “Schools are in part institutions used for promoting nationalism and militarism 
through activities like celebrating national motherland days, naming schools after 
military heroes, showing pictures of atrocities and holding competitions in poetry and 
essay-writing based on nationalistic themes or ‘glories of the past’ of each nation.”28  
 
There is another aspect of post-war education that cannot be overlooked. Education in 
post-conflict societies cannot be traditionally defined according to the ages of school-
age children in ‘normal’ conflict-free societies: “In divided and violent transformation 
societies, youth cannot be defined in terms of rigid age categories. Ten-year-old child 
soldiers are adults in some ways. Thirty-five-year old combatants, who have sacri-
ficed their youth to their cause, may become a ‘lost generation’ if they are denied ac-
cess to education and employment.”29 Therefore, educational reform strategies must 
address traditional compulsory primary and secondary education, as well as adult 
learning, vocational training and higher education. Large numbers of demobilized 
soldiers will not be easily reintegrated into civilian life if they do not have the skills 
needed to succeed or at least support their family. In the absence of education, they 
could be a force for continued social strife rather than a force for advancement. 
 
The role of outside actors in post-conflict educational reform is still poorly defined 
and understood. Outside actors, believing education is best handled by the people of 
the community itself, are often reluctant to become involved in major reform efforts. 
Generally, it is agreed that outside actors should play a primarily supportive role, with 
most of the decision-making devolved to local actors to ensure appropriate solutions 
and local ownership.30 However, in some cases politicians and spoilers seeking to 
prolong the conflict preclude local self-initiative. The injection of external actors can, 
in these cases, minimize the effect of anti-peace, anti-progress spoilers. BiH is an ex-
ample of a case in which the role of local authorities and international authorities is 
                                      
27 Thomas Crampton, “The Ongoing Battle Over Japan’s Textbooks”, International Herald Tribune, 12 
February 2002, 3. 
28 Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, “A Partnership Between Peace Education and Conflict Resolution: 
The Case of Cyprus”(2000), at http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~cerpe/papers/mariaht.htm. 
29 Stephanie Schell-Fauson, “Conflict Transformation through Educational and Youth Programmes”, 
Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation, Berlin, April 2001, 2. 
30 Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces…, 27. 
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frequently debated, because there often appears to be a trade-off between locally-
owned processes that fail to facilitate change in a timely manner, and externally im-
posed processes that, while potentially more expedient, may not in themselves provide 
the basis for a model of the democratic process. 
 
Historian James Tent’s study of US reeducation and de-nazification efforts goes be-
yond specific issues of political indoctrination and ‘decontamination’ and illustrates 
that the overall effort entailed general educational reform. While there are certainly 
differences in the two cases, some similarities between the international educational 
reform effort in Germany then and the IC effort in BiH today are striking. During the 
American occupation of Germany after World War II, education was a key part of the 
democratization and de-nazification effort made possible in the environment of un-
conditional surrender.31 However, even in the German case the US was uncomfortable 
with this task because it fell outside its military and even its civil-military affairs func-
tions, and there was unfortunately no other agency prepared to assume this responsi-
bility.32 Officials consistently noted the need for the German people to bear the main 
burden of reform with only assistance from the US. This approach (coupled with the 
rigorous de-nazification effort) both ensured local ownership and the development of 
appropriate ideas and minimized the Americans’ mandate in a role they were uncom-
fortable playing. Tent also briefly reviews Britain and France’s different approaches 
within their zones, with a particular focus on their level of local involvement. Even in 
a situation of occupation, it becomes clear that education is an issue that will be cov-
eted and protected by the people, and the effectiveness with which external actors can 
negotiate this terrain will determine the ultimate success of the effort. 
                                      
31 The Education and Religious Affairs Branch was responsible for reeducation initiatives. See Tent, 
Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and Denazification in American-Occupied Germany.  
32 Tent, Mission on the Rhine…, 9-10. 
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III. BiH’s Educational Inheritance 
One important factor that reformers must keep in mind is that BiH cannot be viewed 
as a tabula rasa upon which a completely new educational system can be transcribed. 
BiH and the rest of the former Yugoslavia had a high quality and broad-based educa-
tional system that, while in need of reform in the last years before dissolution, pro-
vided for a well-educated and well-trained workforce that reflected the needs and 
structures of the time. Therefore, development strategies intended for societies with 
no tradition of public, compulsory and formal education cannot be applied in BiH. 
Similarly, professional educators from throughout the country, while in need of up-
dated skills and methods, must be engaged in the reform process and reformers must 
recognize that they will bring their training and experience to the modernization proc-
ess. This section will very briefly review some basic elements of pre-war and wartime 
education in BiH in order to provide a general backdrop. Section IV will review the 
state of education in BiH today, with an emphasis on the challenges and problems that 
must be addressed as part of any reform process. 
 
A. Education in the Former Yugoslavia  
In general, Yugoslavia33 had a quality education system, which while in need of mod-
ernization in the waning years of its existence, provided its citizens with equitable 
access and a basic foundation of skills and knowledge. In the wake of the devastation 
of the region after World War II and the concurrent civil wars and period of state-
consolidation (during which period over one million people were killed), the President 
of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, considered education “to be one of the most important 
activities for the reconstruction and development of the country.”34 He recognized the 
political role that education could play in terms of uniting people who had been 
through the brutality of World War II as both allies and opponents who then had to 
live together in the same country. Similarly, he was cognizant of the economic role 
education could play as a catalyst for modernization, progress and the development of 
a socialist economy.   
 
                                      
33 The term ‘Yugoslavia’ refers to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia established after World 
War II and in existence until the wars of dissolution in the 1990s. 
34 As cited in Charles J. Russo, “Religion and Education in Bosnia: Integration not Segregation?”, 3 
Brigham Young University Law Review ( 2000), at 951. 
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Education in the former Yugoslavia was viewed as a potentially equalizing force in 
keeping with the goals of the socialist state. The 1958 General Law on Primary Edu-
cation made an eight-year primary school education obligatory.35 Socialist values and 
ideology were not aimed at promoting critical thinking and analysis; rather they 
sought to encourage conformity and dedication to the political regime. As in all ef-
forts to promote ‘brotherhood and unity’, encourage tolerance and dissuade signs of 
nationalism, the educational system in the former Yugoslavia recognized three official 
languages (one of which was Serbo-Croatian, now referred to as Bosnian, Croatian or 
Serbian) and nine ‘nationality’ languages representing the country’s national minori-
ties.36 Bilingual education was offered to over 400,000 primary school children in the 
1970s.37 Cultural expressions deemed as ‘safe’ were allowed, but potentially destabi-
lizing political and nationalist sentiments were suppressed as part of Tito’s heavy-
handed approach to managing ethnic relations. Yugoslavia’s national minorities en-
joyed education and media programmes designed to preserve their heritage while si-
multaneously asserting their “Yugoslav-ness”. As is often the case in Central and 
Southeastern Europe, the state’s commitment to multinationalism often passed over 
the socially marginalized Romani population, and Romani children were over-
represented in special schools for children with mental or physical disabilities.38 
While much of Western Europe passed through a painful catharsis of acknowledge-
ment and recognition of the recent wartime atrocities, in Yugoslavia such openness 
was stifled in exchange for a peaceful coexistence ensured by a relatively comfort-
able, middle class standard of living. The violent history of the twentieth century was 
glossed over in favour of glorious depictions of the creation of the Socialist Yugoslav 
state.  
 
In terms of administration, the educational system was relatively devolved:    
Education was the responsibility of each of the republics and co-ordination ef-
forts at the federal level were primarily concerned with ideology. However, in 
terms of general structure and of curriculum content and form, between 1945 
                                      
35 Ibid., 952. 
36 Council of Europe Programme for Higher Education and Research (Report by the Council of Europe 
for the World Bank), Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration, 
10 November 1999, 3.   
37 Ibid., 44. 
38 Save the Children, Denied a Future? The Right to Education of Roma Children in Europe, Report on 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2002, 47.  
 
 
21
and 1990 the education system in the Socialist Republic of Bosnia-
Herzegovina was not substantially different from that in the other republics of 
the former Yugoslavia.39  
At the local level, educational administration was directed by the concept of ‘self-
management’ typical of Tito’s brand of socialism. Through a series of committees this 
approach sought to ensure participatory decision-making and planning which was 
reflective of an ideology in which workers owned the means of production. Commu-
nity input ensured local participation within the centralized ideological parameters 
established by the state. While theoretically a good idea, self-management, with its 
demands for consensus, extensive low-level consultations and bargaining, in effect led 
to an inefficient system with minimal accountability or individual responsibility in 
which any one of the many consultative stages could delay progress on necessary de-
cisions or reforms.40 
 
The 1974 Constitution that further significantly decentralized social and political life 
in Yugoslavia affected education as well, particularly in terms of management and 
financing:  
While central party control ensured a degree of national consistency of educa-
tion programmes and delivery, local resources varied considerably. As a result, 
the quality of education progressively diverged between richer and poorer 
parts of the country, and significant disparities emerged among and even 
within the several Republics and Autonomous Provinces.41  
This disparity in educational spending paralleled similar financial disparities occur-
ring throughout the country as the economic recession of the 1970s and 1980s began 
to have an impact on social programmes and ultimately on state stability. After Tito’s 
death in 1980, the singular Yugoslav ideology he embodied, embraced and promoted 
began to dilute in the absence of a single, effective successor to carry on his legacy. In 
a late expression of centralization in 1987 “the first common ‘all-Yugoslav’ core cur-
riculum was introduced.”42 However, this did not last, for as the Yugoslav economic 
                                      
39 Mr. Lluis Maria de Puig, Rapporteur on Education, Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Docu-
ment 8663), 14 March 2000, Council of Europe, at 
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc00/EDOC8663.HTM. 
40 Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration, 5-6.  
41 Ibid, 51. 
42 Russo, Religion and Education…,  952. Citing Srebren Dizdar (Permanent Secretary of the Ministry 
of Education Science, Culture and Sport, Republic of Bosnia Herzegovina, 1994), A Development and 
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and political environment deteriorated in the early 1990s, the educational system be-
came increasingly decentralized and politicized, both throughout Yugoslavia and 
within BiH itself.  
 
B. Wartime Education 
The end of the Cold War and the single party state, combined with continued eco-
nomic deterioration, led to the rapid disintegration of the Yugoslav political system.  
Yugoslavia’s six republics,43 which since 1974 had enjoyed increasing autonomy 
while still under the single framework of the country’s unique brand of socialism, 
began to focus more on their needs (and dominant national groups) and devoted less 
attention to advancing the interests of the Yugoslav state. The unintended conse-
quence of political liberalization and multiparty elections was the rise of nationalist 
politicians who consolidated their power bases in the republics. Croatia and Slovenia 
declared their independence from Yugoslavia in 1991 and gained recognition from the 
IC as independent states. The Yugoslav National Army, controlled by Belgrade, inter-
vened to stop these secessions and Slovenia experienced a short 11-day war, while 
Croatia endured fighting until the declaration of a January 1992 ceasefire. Bosnia fol-
lowed suit and declared its independence in April 1992. However, as the most hetero-
geneous of the republics, with Bosnian Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Serbs 
all living within the republic’s borders, the secession led to a three and a half year war 
that would ultimately claims the lives of approximately 200,000 people. 
 
The region’s educational landscape reflected the political change and upheaval that 
marked the final days of Yugoslavia. From 1990 to 1992 the curricula was increas-
ingly politicised by nationalist politicians representing the three main groups in BiH, 
creating cleavages that were intensified during the war from 1992 to 1995. National-
ist-driven teachings promoted division and fear, preparing the ground for ethnic 
cleansing operations aimed primarily against the Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) popula-
tion. Once the war began, education was seriously disrupted throughout the country, 
as massive population displacements, fighting and economic shortages ravaged BiH. 
                                                                                                          
Perspective on Teacher Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1998. See also Srebren Dizdar, the 
UNICEF-commissioned report, “Situation Analysis of Educational Services for Children in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina”, November 1996, at www.pitt.edu/~ginie/bosnia/pdf/analysis.pdf. 
43 Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia. 
 
 
 
23
During the war, 60 per cent of all schools were damaged, destroyed or requisitioned 
for military use.44 University, public and private libraries were destroyed with alarm-
ing efficiency.45 However, many schools continued to operate out of sheer determina-
tion and improvisation. In Sarajevo, a city struggling to live normally while under 
siege, schools operated on a shortened calendar in school buildings or private homes 
when possible.46 Secondary schools met more regularly than primary schools and sub-
jects were taught as teachers were available. In this respect the cities in BiH had a 
great advantage over rural areas as there was a larger pool of educated people who 
could serve as teachers if qualified instructors were not available. Rural villages de-
pendent on regional schools or on teachers traveling to the village from other towns, 
had fewer resources to ensure education could continue. 
 
In addition to the physical hardships of attempting to continue education during a time 
of war, the general trauma of war took its toll on both students and teachers. Towns 
and villages that were the sites of ethnic cleansing ushered in horrors not seen in 
Europe since WWII. The siege of Sarajevo, which lasted three and a half years, was 
even more difficult to comprehend in a city which had boasted of its multiculturalism 
and in which many mixed marriages and multiethnic families made the fighting 
among fellow Bosnians that much more incomprehensible. School, however, even on 
an abbreviated schedule, was one way to try to continue some semblance of normal 
life and could therefore potentially serve as a coping mechanism for students and par-
ents alike. 
 
In spite of the shelling, death, destruction and total disruption of normal patterns of 
life, Charles Russo writes that, “In retrospect, many educators in Sarajevo believe that 
the war forced them to develop new approaches in working with students and required 
them to adopt new teaching methodologies”, becoming less hierarchical and teacher-
                                      
44 Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1996-1998 Lessons and Accomplishments, Review of the Priority Recon-
struction Program. Prepared for the May 1999 Donor’s Conference co-hosted by the European Com-
mission and the World Bank. 
45 For a thorough review of the destruction of libraries and documents in the war, see Andras Riedl-
mayer, “Convivencia under Fire: Genocide and Book-burning in Bosnia”, and J. Rose (ed.), The Holo-
caust and the Book: Destruction and Preservation Studies in Print Culture and the History of the Book 
(Amherst, Mass., 2001), 266-291.  
46 See, David M. Berman, “The Organization of War Schools During the Siege of Sarajevo, 1992-
1995”, Sociological Imagination, Special Issue on “Bosnia and Sociology” (1999), 36:2/3, 183-198. 
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centred than had been the norm in the region.47 If the adage, “necessity is the mother 
of invention” is true, then the innovation needed to continue education during war 
provided an opportunity for a more cooperative learning environment to emerge from 
the teacher-centred approach that dominated pre-war Yugoslavia. The wartime envi-
ronment released society from past restrictions and expectations and impacted tradi-
tional social roles and relationships.48 It also suggested an adaptability among educa-
tors that could be tapped in post-war educational efforts, if the political will existed to 
utilize this resource. 
                                      
47 As cited in Charles J. Russo, “Religion and Education in Bosnia: Integration not Segregation?”, 3 
Brigham Young University Law Review (2000), at 953. 
48 Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces…, 24. 
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IV. Post-War Education in BiH 
The state of education in post-war BiH shares many characteristics with the overall 
social and political environment of the country as it emerged from the ashes of Yugo-
slavia. In order to preserve BiH as a multiethnic state, a complex web of power-
sharing mechanisms were developed. The DPA confirmed BiH as a single, independ-
ent state, comprised of two highly autonomous ‘entities’, the predominantly Bosniak 
(Bosnian Muslim) and Bosnian Croat (Bosnian Catholic) Federation of BiH (FBiH) 
and the predominantly Bosnian Serb (Bosnian Orthodox) Republika Srpska (RS). The 
Federation is further divided into ten cantons, five of which are majority Bosniak, 
three of which are majority Bosnian Croat, and two of which are mixed.49 While the 
capital of the FBiH is Sarajevo (which is also the capital of the state of BiH), the Fed-
eration is very decentralized, with significant authority and resources devolved to the 
cantons, or even to the municipalities. The RS, while divided into municipalities, is 
more centralized, with much decision-making power centred in Banja Luka. BiH’s 
educational systems must be understood against this complex political and constitu-
tional backdrop. The following sections will introduce the state of affairs in BiH edu-
cation before reform efforts began to gain momentum and realize changes in policy 
and in practice. 
 
A. Legal Framework and Structures 
In post-Dayton BiH, education has been highly decentralized in the Federation and 
highly centralized in the RS. Article III of the BiH constitution details the responsi-
bilities of the state-level institutions, with article 3 noting that: “All governmental 
functions and powers not expressly assigned in this Constitution to the institutions of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be those of the Entities.” Section III, article 4(b) of the 
constitution of the Federation states that the cantons shall have all responsibilities not 
expressly granted to the Federation government, including “making education policy, 
including decisions concerning the regulation and provision of education.” Article 38 
of the RS constitution states that: “everyone shall be entitled to education under equal 
                                      
49 The Federation of BiH consists of ten cantons. Five are Bosniak majority (Una-Sana, Tuzla-Podrinje, 
Zenica-Doboj, Bosna-Drina Gorazde, and Sarajevo), three are majority Bosnian Croat (Western 
Herzegovina, Posavina, and Livno-Tomislav), and two mixed cantons (Herzegovina-Neretva and 
Central Bosnia). 
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conditions”, that “primary schooling shall be compulsory and free”, and “everyone 
shall have access, under the same conditions, to secondary and higher education.” 
 
In the Federation, cantonal level laws on primary education, secondary education and 
education inspection provide a legal framework for operations. In the RS, primary 
schools are regulated by the Law on Primary School and the Law on Inspection for 
Education, while secondary schools are regulated through the Law on Secondary 
Education. In the Brčko District, one law (imposed by the District Supervisor) regu-
lates both primary and secondary schooling.50 
 
There are approximately 19,600 primary and 9000 secondary school teachers in 
BiH.51 A 2001 report estimates the total number of primary and secondary schools at 
920, educating a total of approximately 507,000 students.52 There are seven Peda-
gogic Institutes authorized by the cantonal and RS ministries of education to provide 
in-service teacher training. Education is compulsory for eight years, with secondary 
school following for an additional three to four years. In terms of higher education, 
while pre-war BiH was home to four universities, post-war BiH hosts seven.53 The 
university system in BiH consists of approximately 70 component institutions or fac-
ulties, each of which has significant autonomy. Universities are currently regarded as 
“associations of Faculties”.54 The faculties are funded directly, rather than through the 
university, and authority is further devolved to individual professors, who have sig-
nificant authority to admit students, structure their course of study, examine and pro-
mote students - all with little accountability.55   
 
 
 
                                      
50 For a thorough review of educational administration practices, including hiring teachers, school 
boards, school establishment and other details, see the OSCE MBiH Inter-Agency Guidelines to the 
Field: Monitoring and Intervening in Education-Related Issues, August 2002. 
51 Model for System Change in Secondary Education. Open Society Fund BH.  
52 Paul Roeders and Hugh Glanville, Technical Assistance to the Education Reforms in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, EC-TAER Inception Report, 31 January 2001, 16. 
53 Sarajevo, East Mostar, West Mostar, Serb Sarajevo, Bihać, Zenica, Banja Luka and Tuzla.  
54 Hugh Glanville, “Towards an IC Strategy in Support of Higher Education in BiH”, internal document 
of the EC-TAER programme, 2001. 
55 As of this writing, only Tuzla University has made progress in ending the status of faculties as 
independent legal units. 
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B. Reform Needs 
1. Administration and Finance 
The Federation-level Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport (FBiH MOE) 
has until recently had substantial influence only in the Bosniak majority regions. As 
the DPA places responsibility for education at the cantonal level, there is significant 
parallelism among the ten cantons, with more cooperation evident among the five 
Bosniak-majority and among three Bosnian Croat majority cantons. In the mixed can-
tons of Central Bosnia and Neretva there are parallel educational systems even within 
the canton, with little coordination.56 Subsequently, these parallel systems fail to 
benefit from economies of scale and suffer from duplication, redundancy and an ex-
pensive system in an already poverty-stricken country.57 Additionally, the complete 
decentralization has led to a situation in which there is virtually no financial account-
ability for educational administrators. These financial weaknesses, compounded by 
the poor state of the economy, result in a system in which “the highest spending areas 
spend more than twice per student at all levels than the lowest spending areas.”58 In 
addition to the financial concerns, the multiple levels of government in the Federation 
(entity, cantonal, municipal) have led to ambiguity concerning who is responsible for 
what at what level, creating an environment in which there is little accountability or 
responsibility.  
 
There has been support for policy change in the Federation among the Bosniaks, who 
in general favour a more centralized system consistent with a tendency to support a 
more highly centralized state structure, while the Bosnian Croats have generally pre-
ferred a decentralized system in which more control is given to the cantons. Early 
reform efforts met considerable resistance from representatives of the Catholic church 
because they often viewed suggestions for a course in ‘culture of religions’ to be the 
beginning of the end of the newly established religious education.59 However, while it 
was difficult to encourage the Bosnian Croats to accept more streamlined, harmonized 
                                      
56 For a good review of the legal situation in BiH’s cantons and regions, see Education in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration, 1999.  
57 Budgets are so stretched that supplies are often unavailable and teacher salaries unpaid. In September 
2002, educational workers in the Central Bosnia Canton went on a general strike in protest against 
unpaid salaries from the previous year.  
58 World Bank, World Bank Project Appraisal Document for an Education Development Project, 19 
April 2000, 9.  
59 Personal interview, Claude Kieffer, Sarajevo, 1 February 2002. 
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and centralized educational initiatives in the initial years of reform, this is beginning 
to change. Apart from the identity issues inherent in the ‘national subjects’ such as 
language and history, there is recognition by both sides of the need for basic reform.60 
When the HDZ’s (the hardline Bosnian Croat party) third entity movement failed in 
the spring of 2001, OHR contacted the ministers of education in the HDZ-dominated 
cantons to encourage them to again work within the system. As it became increasingly 
clear among practical-minded Bosnian Croat leaders that Europe-focused Zagreb 
would no longer morally or financially support the political efforts of their Bosnian 
cousins, the choice left to the Bosnian Croats became involvement in the reform proc-
ess or exclusion from the debate. In 2002, officials noted that the Bosnian Croats were 
becoming increasingly cooperative and in favour of a state-level law on education – 
something that was unthinkable a few years ago.61 
 
Education in the RS is more centralized, and while there is some difference in ap-
proach and outlook among the north and eastern parts of the boomerang-shaped re-
gion, all schools and educators face the same problems and challenges. Similar to the 
Federation, financial accountability is a concern primarily because of a lack of trans-
parency within budgeting and spending processes. The Bosnian Serbs are, as with 
virtually all policies, against state-level laws that could weaken entity powers. How-
ever, potential obstructionists have been warned by the IC not to hold the issue hos-
tage to political manoeuvrings. 
 
At every level of educational management, reforms are needed in finance and admini-
stration to lower costs and develop a more harmonized system within which students 
can move and transfer without difficulty. Legislation to ensure that the systems in 
place throughout BiH meet certain minimal standards and expectations will help to 
counteract inequities and potential problems with access to educational resources. 
Such harmonization will not only improve internal accountability, but will lend pro-
fessionalism to the system as a whole and make it easier to integrate into the broader 
European educational networks. 
 
                                      
60 Personal interview, Hugh Glanville, Sarajevo, November 2002. 
61 Personal interview, Claude Kieffer, Sarajevo, 4 February 2003. 
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2. The Politicization of Education 
This extreme decentralization, compounded with little accountability and a politi-
cal environment that continues to be dominated by fear and manipulated by na-
tionalist politicians, has created a structure in which abuse and inequity can flour-
ish. In a 2000 COE report, the gap between legislation and implementation of 
policies meant to ensure equal access to education - particularly among minority 
returnees - was vividly described: 
We were informed by Mr. Dragosavljević, the Republika Srpska Deputy 
Minister for Education, that each school with at least 25 non-Serb pupils 
could request instruction in their mother tongue and follow their own cur-
riculum. We later learned that this is not true of a single school in the Re-
publika Srpska. On the contrary, Bosniac and Croat children are obliged to 
follow the Serb curriculum. 
The same situation obtains [sic] in the Federation. For example, at the be-
ginning of the current academic year the media reported that some 300 
children of Bosniac refugees had been unable to attend school in Žepće 
municipality, where the Croat curriculum is used, and that some 250 Croat 
refugee children had faced difficulties in Bugojno, which has a Bosniac 
majority. Similar problems have been reported in Stolac, Čapljina and 
Vareš.62 
Through this and other studies, it became evident that the politicization of education 
was not a localized phenomenon, but a deliberate strategy by nationalist politicians to 
use the politics of identity and fear to continue the war by other means in spite of the 
peace agreement. 
 
Possibly the most visible and obvious symbol of the politicization of education in BiH 
is the ‘two schools under one roof’ phenomenon. This practice was evident in various 
forms throughout BiH, particularly in the Muslim-Croat Federation,63 and was acutely 
                                      
62 Mr. Lluis Maria de Puig, Rapporteur on Education, Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Docu-
ment 8663), 14 March 2000, Council of Europe, at  
http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc00/EDOC8663.HTM. 
63 Schools might be separated by floor, wing or staggered school hours. 
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vivid in Stolac, where Bosnian Croat children attended a new school that had been 
built with World Bank funds, while Bosniak children were forced to be schooled out 
of private homes in sub-standard conditions. Upon hearing of this egregious situation, 
OHR stepped in and said that if space in the new school was available (and it was), 
the Bosniak children should be able to benefit from the World Bank project as well. 
While a good intention, the OHR underestimated the divisions in Stolac and the na-
tionalist politics that drive the hardline city in Herzegovina. Rather than integrating 
the Bosniak children into the school, the school was essentially divided into Bosnian 
Croat and Bosniak sections, separating students by floor, with piles of chairs and 
desks serving as barriers in the corridors and with separate entrances for each group. 
Other similar cases occurred in BiH as nationalists sought to ensure the minimal level 
of compliance and to continue homogenous education to the maximum extent possi-
ble.64 Despite proposals by the IC to merge the schools, the situation in Stolac re-
mained unchanged even in 2003.65 
 
3. Access 
The issue of access to education and educational facilities is closely linked to the poli-
ticization of education. In 2002, Dr. Paul Roeders of the European Commission Tech-
nical Assistance to Education Reform (EC TAER) programme estimated that between 
5000-10,000 students crossed the Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) to go to school 
each day. This brings to light the concerns many minority returnees have concerning 
the education their children might receive as minority members of the community. In 
March 2003, the OSCE referred to “the widespread phenomena of bussing children to 
monoethnic schools long distances from their homes.”66 Additionally, while students 
                                      
64 In 2003, the OSCE estimated that there are 56 such schools in the Federation, with many in the Cen-
tral Bosnia, Herzegovina Neretva and Zenica-Doboj Cantons. “OSCE Concerned Over Segregation of 
Students”, OSCE Press Release, 3 April 2003. A Bosniak secondary school annex in Žepće was opened 
to much fanfare in April 2002, though it was understood that it would, at least at the beginning, be “2 
schools under 1 roof.”  In his remarks, PDHR Hays noted that while the return of Bosniak students to 
the Žepće secondary school was an important step, it was only a transitional step towards a truly equal 
and integrated system. He also noted that computer classes would be integrated as “the future is high 
tech and the future doesn’t care about ethnicity”. “Remarks by PDHR Donald Hays at the opening of 
the Bosniak  Secondary School Annex in Zepce”, OHR Press Release, 3 April 2002. 
65 Dnevni Avaz, 7 January 2003, as cited in OHR Media Round-up, 7 January 2003.  
66 “Bussing children to mono-ethnic schools must stop”, OSCE Press Release, 13 March 2003. On 13 
March the OSCE noted two extreme examples that illustrate the extent of the problem: “Approximately 
10 returnee children are being bussed 15 kilometres to the school in Dejčići (Trnovo, FBiH) but live 
only a few hundred meters from the primary school in Trnovo (RS) which was completely recon-
structed and equipped in 1996.  [Also] children from Bukovaća (FBiH) are being bussed to the village 
of Drinić (RS), while the Bukovaća reconstructed school remains empty.” They further point out the 
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might have basic, physical access to a school, the reception and education they might 
receive once inside is not always assured. The COE and the World Bank noted that 
“pupils of a minority cultural or religious orientation can still gain access to majority 
schools, provided they conform to the dominant cultural and religious views [empha-
sis added].”67 This conformity to majority views is not only impossible in BiH’s post-
war environment, but antithetical to European standards, and therefore severely limits 
educational access to students who are a minority in a community. 
 
Access can be broadly interpreted in order to assess the entire set of issues that can 
make a school appear to be accessible or inaccessible, particularly by a member of a 
minority population. Physical or geographic access to schools relates particularly to 
children in rural areas and considers whether or not they can realistically attend school 
due to the infrastructure in their area. This is particularly important in minority return 
areas or in Romani communities, where adequate roads or transportation may be lack-
ing, making it more difficult for children from these communities to attend school 
regularly.  
 
A second kind of access is psychosocial, which is particularly relevant to returnee 
children, or to children who are in a minority in their community and/or school. The 
trauma of war and the difficulty of post-war return inevitably makes minority return a 
stressful experience, for adults as well as students. Concerns over discrimination 
based on the dialect of the local language that a child speaks, the alphabet (Latin or 
Cyrillic) that a child has studied, or basic prejudice by teachers or fellow students can 
erect psychological barriers that can impede real access to education.  
 
Symbolic access must also be considered, as symbolic barriers such as national and 
religious symbols can create a hostile atmosphere (for instance, the presence of a cru-
cifix, an Islamic banner, or a Serbian flag) for a student who is not in the majority and 
for whom the symbol may have highly negative connotations. Finally, contextual ac-
cess relates to curricular and educational content issues, and refers to the content bar-
                                                                                                          
expense of such practices: “Municipal authorities in Travnik calculated that 35-40,000 KM is being 
spent monthly on transporting students and that this amount could be reduced by 50% if children attend 
the school closest to their residence.” 
67 Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration,  10. 
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riers that may exist in a curriculum that make it difficult for a child to attend school in 
a positive and comfortable environment, an issue which is discussed in more detail 
below.  
 
4. Curriculum and the ‘National Subjects’ 
The debate concerning curriculum reform can essentially be divided into two issues: 
basic curricular structure and content. There is general agreement that the numbers of 
courses in the current curriculum is too high, with approximately 15 different sub-
jects, and should be reduced, reorganized into compulsory and elective subjects and 
made more flexible. Rather than serving as a framework ensuring that students ac-
quire a certain set of skills, curricula in BiH today are more a checklist to ensure that 
information is transmitted to the students for memorization and recall. While reform-
ing this approach will necessitate teaching training and changes in classroom method-
ology, it is a technical and professional issue that can be addressed over time without 
significant controversy. 
 
Additionally, the pedagogical methods currently in place to teach a curriculum must 
also be updated. Teacher training is desperately needed, as a result of antiquated, pre-
war teaching methods, the impact of the war and resultant brain-drain and the politici-
zation of the authorities and the educational environment. In its 1999 report, the 
COE/World Bank noted that in some areas up to 25 per cent of teachers were not 
qualified for the level or grade they taught.68 The problem needs to be assessed and 
addressed, and incentives must be offered to attract qualified people to the teaching 
profession. Approaches and techniques that encourage critical thought, a multiper-
spective approach and an open learning environment must be in place to support a 
modernized curricular structure. Teaching and learning must be democratized, with 
values transmitted in action as well as word: “Curriculum packages that promote tol-
erance will have little impact if they are delivered within educational structures that 
are fundamentally intolerant.”69 
 
                                      
68 Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration, 46.  
69 Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces…, foreword. 
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Content-centred reform efforts have proved to be much more controversial and have 
absorbed a large part of the reform efforts to date. Math, biology, health and other 
subjects are not the core of the problem.70 The so-called ‘national subjects’ dominate 
discussion, with history, literature, geography, religion, language, art and music 
deemed to be of vital interest to the three constituent peoples and an important me-
dium for transmitting essential cultural values. The national subjects are the most dif-
ficult curricular issue to reform and address and they are controversial precisely be-
cause they hit to the core of interpreting the region’s distant and recent political, cul-
tural and social history. It has been suggested that the controversy concerning the na-
tional subjects is not so much an issue of actual attempts by one ethnic group to im-
pose its culture on others; rather it is the parents’ fear that their children will be indoc-
trinated in the culture of another group in those schools in which one or another par-
ticular cultural outlook tends to dominate.71 National subjects, such as language and 
literature, are “two essential components in what has been called the ‘naturalization of 
citizens’, and are therefore a part of nationalist processes that seek to maintain this 
fictive image of cultural homogeneity.”72  
 
The issue of national subjects continues to be inflammatory and has been used by na-
tionalist politicians to stall reform efforts. Non-political reforms that are sorely 
needed, such as teacher training, standards and assessment and skills-focused curric-
ula, have been overshadowed by debates on textbooks, histories and these national 
subjects. Although the national subjects are a potentially legitimate venue for teaching 
about a particular culture, they can also potentially create division, perpetrate stereo-
types and promote questionable historical interpretations and cultural myths. At a 
more basic level, the physical segregation of students either choosing not to attend 
these classes, or opting for other curricular or extracurricular classes, perpetuates a 
division that will not likely be helpful in forging a common BiH identity among BiH’s 
youth. Satisfactory compromise solutions that enable the study of one’s culture with-
out disparaging others, must be identified and implemented. 
                                      
70 These technical subjects were always a strength in the Yugoslav system, as well as in other commu-
nist countries, as they rely on simple transmission of facts and do not necessitate or lead to multiple 
perspectives or interpretations. 
71 Personal interview, Hugh Glanville, Sarajevo, November 2002.  
72 Bush and Saltarelli, The Two Faces…,  6. 
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History and Geography 
It should come as no surprise that the issue of teaching history is politically charged 
and controversial. However, BiH is far from unique in facing this problem.73 From 
10-13 May 2000 the COE, together with the OHR, sponsored a symposium in Sara-
jevo entitled, “Rebuilding a Common Future: For a Critical Approach to History 
Teaching”.74 This meeting was not only for educators from BiH, but for teachers 
throughout the COE member states teaching twentieth century European history. The 
symposium provided a forum for embarking on initial steps towards developing an 
objective history of the region. 
 
Teaching history is not solely dependent on the textbooks used in the classroom, but 
in how material is presented to the students. The following excerpt from a 1999 COE 
report on the topic illustrates the impact of both content and presentation: 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was concerned nonetheless about the problem of re-
thinking history in a country where past wounds have not had time to heal and 
proposed that the content of less controversial subjects such as life sciences 
and mathematics be reviewed first. Reacting to [a participant’s] fears, the other 
countries argued that it was precisely because of the controversial nature of 
history that it was so urgent to deal with the teaching of this subject. However, 
the modernization of history teaching was also dependent on improved train-
ing for history teachers. Changing the syllabus was not enough: it was impor-
tant to train teachers to provide a more critical-minded form of teaching, to 
question the world and to compare points of view, steering clear of official or 
supposedly sacrosanct versions of the truth.75 
In BiH, each of the three constituent peoples has their own preferred interpretation of 
history, with the Bosnian Croat view influenced by Zagreb and the Bosnian Serb view 
                                      
73 The International Herald Tribune reported that in August 2001 “20 men in Seoul draped themselves 
in Korea’s national colours and ceremonially chopped off part of their little fingers to protest the word-
ing in one Japanese textbook.” It was only in mid-1990s that Japanese officials began to grapple with 
how to portray and explain the country’s policies during WWII. “The Ongoing Battle over Japan’s 
Textbooks”, International Herald Tribune, 12 February 2002, 3. There have been no similar protests 
involving such extreme measures in BiH. 
74 The symposium was hosted by the Federation Ministry of Education, Science, Culture and Sport, 
with the support of the Academy of Sciences of BiH. 
75 “Education for Democratic Development and Stability in South-east Europe: Final Declaration and 
Ideas”.  Informal Conference of Ministers of Education from Southeast Europe, held under the auspices 
of the Council of Europe Standing Conference of European Ministers of Education, December 1999, 
10.  
 
 
35
by Belgrade. The Bosniak frame of reference is different, as the Bosnian Muslims do 
not have a kin-state. They have therefore been more amenable to new texts, while 
maintaining an interest in the role that the Ottoman empire played in shaping the cul-
ture of BiH. 
 
Geography is a similarly politically-charged topic that is directly related to the kin-
states of Croatia and Serbia. A textbook used in primary schools in the RS provides a 
vivid example of the politicization of geography in post-war BiH.76 The map graphic 
on the cover of the book shows the regions of Serbia and Montenegro and the RS, 
without any sign of surrounding states, as if that map represented a single country. 
The book’s discussion of state symbols reviews the symbols of the RS, the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro. Belgrade, Podgorica, Srpsko Sara-
jevo and Banja Luka are included in the section on ‘capital cities’. Srpsko Sarajevo is 
described as the part of Sarajevo that is in the RS and while a post-war creation, its 
history is gloriously portrayed: “Throughout its five centuries long history it has al-
ways borne the mark of Serb creation and existence.” Similar texts demonstrating a 
bias towards Croatia can be found in schools in Croat majority parts of BiH. In gen-
eral, such content teaches not just geography, but political allegiance, thereby chal-
lenging the integrity of BiH as a state in its own right. 
 
Language and Literature 
Language is similarly controversial. While in 2001 it became obligatory to teach both 
alphabets in primary and secondary schools in both entities, implementation of this 
has not been consistent or guaranteed.77 Before the war, all students spoke and studied 
Serbo-Croatian, often alternating between the Latin and Cyrillic scripts every other 
week. Since the war and the proclamation of three distinct languages (and active at-
tempts to differentiate each from one another through the introduction of new words, 
spellings and pronunciation), the right to speak ‘one’s own’ language has become a 
demand closely linked to identity. At the beginning of the school year in 2002, Bos-
nian Serb high school students in Drvar decided to boycott the school after the au-
                                      
76 The textbook title is Atlas of Contour (Blank) Maps for the 3rd and 4th Grades of Primary School by 
Dr. Stevo Pasalić. It has been banned by the OHR. 
77 Speech by Principal Deputy High Representative Donald Hays to an OHR-sponsored Conference on 
Education in BiH, OHR Speech, 22 January 2002. 
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thorities denied their requests for the introduction of their national subjects curriculum 
and the right to study in the Serbian rather than Croatian language.78 Parents of pri-
mary school pupils had also made demands regarding the use of the Serbian language 
for their children, threatening to pull their children out of the school.79 There are many 
similar examples of discontent, particularly in areas experiencing high minority return 
and regions where the majority balance is shifting in the face of return. 
 
Literature has also been politicized. While the teaching of Serb epic poems might be 
viewed as study of legitimate cultural heritage by Bosnian Serbs, it can be seen as an 
expression of extreme nationalism by Bosniaks. Bosnian Croat curricula tends to em-
phasize Croatian writers, Bosnian Serb curricula Serbian writers, and Bosniak curric-
ula literature from the Ottoman era and Bosniak writers - all to the detriment of a 
well-rounded and broad literary experience. Through reforms pushed in 2002, “since 
September [2002], 20-40 periods annually have been set aside to teach the literature 
of the three constituent peoples in the primary and secondary school curriculum.”80 
This demonstrates progress, an example of compromise, and the need for continued 
monitoring to ensure full compliance and implementation. 
 
Religion  
Since the introduction of religious education in the early 1990s, religion classes have 
been taught more as a catechism than as an academic subject, leaving little room for 
participation and inclusion of children of a different faith.81 Religious instruction has 
been affected by the dual impact of the ability to teach religion after years of official 
atheism and the politicization of religion during the war: “Following the first multi-
party elections in BiH in 1990, the Ministry of Education introduced religious educa-
tion in schools in order to satisfy the intention to respect and enforce human rights. 
The Ministry of Education initiated this change to move beyond the previous educa-
                                      
78 Glas Srpski, as reported in OHR Media Round-Up, 20 September 2002. This boycott came on the 
heels of the resignation of Stipe Barac, a Cantonal Minister of Education, who had promised the Serbs 
in Drvar that they would have classes according to a national group of subjects. 
79 Večernji List as reported in OHR Media Round-Up, 16 September 2002. 
80 Speech by Principal Deputy High Representative Donald Hays to an OHR-sponsored Conference on 
Education in BiH,OHR Speech, 22 January 2002. 
81 For specific anecdotes reflecting the results of this approach, see Summary Report on the State of 
Protection of the Right of the Child in the Federation of BiH, Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, 7 May 2001.  
 
 
37
tion system where religion was discriminated against and marginalized.”82 The formal 
separation of religion and education in the US is seen as impossible in BiH at the pre-
sent time.83 After years of being unable to teach religion in schools, many people, 
leaders and religious authorities are loathe to relinquish this vital part of their identity. 
This is not unique to BiH, as Serbia and Croatia have also introduced official religious 
instruction in their schools.  
 
While religion classes themselves do not have to be problematic, whether they are a 
mandatory requirement or an optional elective is important: “In theory, religious edu-
cation classes in public schools in BiH are optional. The reality is that in some can-
tons and municipalities, children who do not choose to attend these classes are subject 
to pressure and discrimination from peers and teachers.”84 State-wide introduction of 
a “Culture of Religions” course that teaches about many religions from a cultural 
standpoint provides one compromise option.85 Optional or the introduction of extra-
curricular modules for religious instruction could minimize segregated study time 
during regular school hours.  
 
It is important to note that religion does not have to be eliminated from the schools to 
ensure peace and stability in a multiethnic state. A 2000 United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) Youth report notes: “We think the inclusion of religious educa-
tion may be one of many steps that can lead our country towards recovery. If we can 
separate the essential principles of a religious tradition from the way religion was used 
to manipulate the population to take part in war, then perhaps we can move towards 
the beginning of healing.”86 As with all of the national subjects, the goal should be to 
maximize the time students spend in a classroom together so that tolerance can be 
learned through the simple process of going to school.  
                                      
82 Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina Youth, UN Development Programme, 2000, 
19. 
83 Russo, Religion and Education…, 965. 
84 Ibid.,  961. 
85 Initial proposals for such a course were poorly received, manipulated by nationalist leaders and in-
terpreted as an attempt to remove religious instruction in the schools, prompting the OHR to issue a 
statement noting that the course was not “designed in any way to replace religious instruction where it 
is taught. It is meant to provide objective, non-discriminatory information to all pupils on the four ma-
jor religions practiced in BiH and their respective traditions.”  
“School Subject ‘Culture of Religions’”, OHR Press Release, 1 December 2000. 
86 Human Development Report Bosnia and Herzegovina Youth, UN Development Programme, 2000, 
20.   
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5. Vocational and University Education 
Although not the primary focus of this paper, vocational and higher education are also 
in need of reform. A review of some of these specific weaknesses and challenges fur-
ther strengthens the case for reform of every aspect of education in BiH. Experts from 
EC-TAER have indicated that 70 per cent of students going to secondary schools at-
tend vocational schools. Changes in the law are needed to ensure that graduates of 
vocational programmes can transfer or apply their vocational degrees for credit and 
admission to university programmes. In the current system, there is virtually no provi-
sion for such a decision: “Graduates are trained in narrow, often occupationally spe-
cific specialization for which there is questionable labour market demand. The secon-
dary system in BiH is, thus, out of alignment with the emerging market economy’s 
need for broad-based skills, labour flexibility and continuous learning.”87 As the coun-
try’s economy continues to stagnate and the ranks of the unemployed swell, voca-
tional training, skills-updating and continuing adult education are vitally needed. 
 
The state of university education has also deteriorated, and there are four key prob-
lems that must be solved if BiH’s universities are to reach a quality that will stem the 
brain-drain that is pulling youth out of the country. First, the current system in which 
legal authority is placed in the individual university faculties, rather than in the uni-
versity itself, and in which professors enjoy virtual autonomy, perpetuates a system 
that lacks accountability and efficiency that must be reformed.88 Second, control of 
higher education must move from a cantonal level concern to an entity level issue in 
the Federation, again to improve accountability and efficiency, and to reflect more 
general European practices. Third, as is the case with primary and secondary educa-
tion in BiH, learning is very professor-oriented, with a focus on repetition of facts 
memorized by students rather than on problem-solving and critical analysis. A re-
formed teaching and learning approach would not only improve the quality of educa-
tion received by the students, but would increase the value of a BiH degree globally 
                                      
87 World Bank Human Development Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region, Project Appraisal 
Document on a Proposed Credit to BiH for an Educational Development Project, 19 April 2000, Re-
port No: 20170 BiH, 5. 
88 Under such a loose structure, it is common for professors to hold multiple posts and therefore rarely 
be available for student support. 
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and help to ensure future accreditation and diploma recognition at institutions of 
higher learning throughout Europe. 
 
A fourth concern is the politicization of universities, through both subtle and obvious 
means.  
The ethnic exclusivity of the universities can be exaggerated. While it is clear 
that most if not all the universities are more ethnically homogenous than be-
fore, this can mainly be put down to a general population displacement and to 
a tradition of attending the local university. There is however a trend towards 
seeking to increase political control over the universities, e.g. through ‘Steer-
ing Boards’ of Canton appointees in the Federation and a Higher Education 
council in the RS.89  
Such politicization directly contradicts the European-wide Bologna Process, which 
seeks to create a single European space for higher education by 2010.90 Although 
adult education faces different challenges than primary and secondary education, it 
will clearly also play a role in the success or failure of ongoing development in BiH. 
 
6. Inclusion of National Minorities 
Finally, in addition to ensuring educational rights and access among the three con-
stituent peoples of BiH, the country’s national minorities’ rights must also be included 
in reform efforts. In the ongoing political debates about BiH’s Bosniaks, Croats and 
Serbs, the country’s real minorities – the Czechs, Hungarians, Macedonians, Albani-
ans, Slovenes, Ukrainians, Jews and Roma – are typically overlooked or forgotten. A 
spring 2001 report noted “a pronounced lack of appropriate arrangements for the 
needs of the minorities such as Roma, Albanians and other children”91, yet as late as 
November 2002, with the exception of Roma-focused capacity building programmes, 
national minorities had not been included in the education reform debate.92 
 
                                      
89 Hugh Glanville, “The Universities of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, unpublished paper, November 2001, 
2.  
90 The Bologna Declaration was signed by 29 European countries in 1999.  
91 Summary Report on the State of Protection of the Right of the Child in the Federation of BiH, Om-
budsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 May 2001, 4.  
92 In November 2002 the European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI) sponsored a workshop in Sara-
jevo entitled “National Minorities and Educational Reform in BiH”. See http://www.ecmi.de for the 
workshop report. 
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The Roma are both the most marginalized national minority, in terms of education 
and society in general and the largest minority population in BiH, with pre-war esti-
mates ranging from 9000 – 80,000. The Save the Children report, Denied A Future 
estimates that 23 per cent of Romani households in BiH are illiterate and that pre-
school and primary school attendance in the FBiH is low, with practically no atten-
dance in secondary or post-secondary education, while in the RS practically no Roma 
attend pre-school.93 Many of the challenges facing Roma in terms of education can be 
more broadly tied to larger social and economic challenges, such as poverty, mistrust 
of government, discrimination, and the “presumed irrelevance of mainstream educa-
tion” of some Roma parents. Additionally, many Romani children are not proficient in 
non-Roma languages and therefore cannot function effectively in a mainstream class-
room.94 
 
These reform issues relate not only to compliance with agreements that BiH has 
signed, but to the economic future of the country, as large groups of marginalized 
people are both a drain on society, as well as a wasted potential resource. Minority 
issues should be mainstreamed into the overall reform efforts, to ensure that the val-
ues of diversity are not compartmentalized, but truly integrated. 
 
There are many other problems and challenges that BiH must overcome: high rates of 
non-attendance and drop-outs;95 the decline in the status of the teaching profession - 
both a cause of, and caused by the inadequacy of teacher training and the lack of sup-
port offered to dedicated teachers;96 the difficult transition facing children returning to 
the BiH system after time abroad and the effect of brain drain on the student body and 
teaching profession. This is simply an overview of some of the most prevalent and 
pressing. 
 
Until reform efforts began, even in ad hoc fashion, manipulation of education was a 
mechanism for continuing the war by other means - discouraging return, inculcating 
                                      
93 Save the Children, Denied a Future, 2002, 47. 
94 Ibid, 76. 
95 The OECD cites the drop out rates in compulsory schools as 20.3%, and in post-compulsory schools 
25.9%. OECD Thematic Review of National Policies for Education – Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 
September 2001, 8. 
96 Prof. (hon.) Dr. Paul Roeders, Towards a Sector Development Programme  in BiH General Educa-
tion, Concept Paper, final version, 31 May 2001, 4. 
 
 
41
hatred and fear and promoting destructive and self-centred nationalism. As govern-
mental bodies have evolved in the wake of the November 2002 elections, at the time 
of this writing it is unknown how the new authorities will affect the reform process 
during its full four-year mandate.97 However, a review of past and current reform ef-
forts can shed some light on the processes and approaches that have brought the post-
war educational system to its current state. 
                                      
97 The government structures built after the November elections are also the first to reflect the constitu-
tional reforms implemented in the spring of 2002, which are aimed at ensuring power-sharing and 
equal rights among the three constituent peoples throughout BiH. 
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V. Reform Efforts 
Although education is briefly noted in Annex 6 of the DPA, the mandate to implement 
educational reform was not awarded to any specific organization as was the case with 
other areas earmarked for reform.98 This did not preclude organizations and agencies 
from addressing the issue, and the following pages will review several of these efforts. 
Additionally, the basic human rights protections guaranteed in Annex 6 (Agreement 
on Human Rights) in principle should have applied to educational access and non-
discrimination in general and in particular to returnees. However, the lack of a spe-
cific mandate in the peace agreement denied education the legitimacy of inclusion and 
the dedicated help of a designated responsible body.  
 
There are several possible explanations for this. First, while policing, elections and 
other tasks were included in the DPA as elements of state-building, education can be 
viewed as a highly ‘personal’ domestic issue in which reluctant international adminis-
trators would be loathe to become involved. It is also a highly bureaucratic, devolved 
and locally-sensitive issue, as in the case of BiH, over half a million students receive 
an education in a system comprised of hundreds of school and thousands of teachers. 
Education therefore has a significant impact on a large percentage of the population 
and reaches into every community. As illustrated earlier, even in the atmosphere of 
unconditional surrender in post-war Germany, American occupiers were uncomfort-
able with this task. In the case of BiH, where there was neither victor nor vanquished, 
and where there is no formal protectorate occupying the country, it is easy to see why 
education was not a priority of Dayton authors preoccupied with the ‘harder’ security-
focused aspects of peace-building, such as military stabilization and policing, and 
with general democratization priorities such as elections. These were the issues that 
were seen as key to stabilization and an ultimate IC exit strategy – a particularly im-
portant imperative for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Implementa-
tion Force (IFOR, later Stabilization Force, or SFOR) peacekeeping troops. 
 
Second, there was no strong organization poised to lobby for inclusion of education in 
the DPA. The IOs that traditionally address educational issues, such as the United 
                                      
98 For example, the OSCE was given the election mandate (Annex 3), UNHCR was given the return 
mandate (Annex 7, article I, 5), and the UN given the police reform mandate (Annex 11). 
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Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the United 
Nations International Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF), were relatively weak 
bodies, made weaker through their UN-affiliation and the poor reputation (not neces-
sarily deserved) that the UN had gained in the eyes of many due to its wartime peace-
keeping experience in BiH. The OSCE, which received the election mandate in Annex 
3 of the DPA in spite of limited election experience, and other civilian diplomatic 
organisations such as the EU or COE, were not present at the Dayton negotiations and 
were not poised to assume or encourage inclusion of an education mandate in the 
peace plans.  
 
Third, the short-term mindset driving the IC during the drafting of the DPA likely 
precluded any thought of efforts requiring long-term commitments, such as educa-
tional reform. There was strong pressure, particularly by the United States, to end the 
international involvement of peacekeeping troops after one year and strong reluctance 
to take any steps that might be seen as indicating extended involvement in the Bal-
kans. Educational reform was viewed as an issue that would tie up international actors 
longer than desired. The realization that one and two year exit strategy plans were 
simply not realistic and that long-term strategies and commitment in the region were 
necessary was gradual. 
 
Finally, it is likely that the parties to the Agreement themselves were not eager to 
hand over educational reform responsibilities to outsiders. After years of fairly cen-
tralized educational control and an environment in which many signs of nationalism 
and virtually all elements of religion were excluded from the curricula, many politi-
cians and citizens were eager to establish ‘their own’ educational systems for the first 
time. Other  ‘soft’ or ‘optional’ issues were included in the DPA such as Annex 8, 
which was included to respond to the destruction of cultural and religious buildings 
during the war. It is likely that Bosniak negotiators made this demand in order to re-
build the over 1,000 damaged or destroyed mosques.99 It is therefore possible that had 
                                      
99 This issue was not included in Richard Holbrooke’s memoirs of the Dayton negotiations, To End a 
War (New York, 1998), and attempts to clarify this with Dayton participants did not yield a definitive 
answer. However, as relatively few such religious/cultural sites were damaged or destroyed represent-
ing Bosnian Serb or Bosnian Croat culture (approximately 100 and 300 respectively), and as there is no 
precedent for outside international actors to insist on inclusion of cultural heritage reconstruction and 
protection, it is likely that it was demanded by the Bosniaks as the party most affected by this form of 
damage. 
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one or more of the parties insisted on the inclusion of educational reform in the 
Agreement, it might have formed part of an existing Annex, or warranted an Annex of 
its own. In the absence of domestic actors willing to commit to post-conflict educa-
tional reform, and outsiders unwilling to become involved in the complex issue, it was 
simply not a priority.100 However, while this may have appealed to Dayton’s authors, 
such an approach was certainly not conducive to the reconciliation or peace-building 
processes. 
 
Educational reform has therefore - until 2002 - been driven by a piecemeal approach 
involving many actors working on a variety of projects with varying degrees of coop-
eration and coordination and without a firm mandate. This created an environment in 
which there was much talk, but little substantive implementation and change. At a 
spring 2001 workshop on history curricula and textbooks, one teacher expressed frus-
tration with the pace of change, noting, “every year we go over the problems and hope 
for some improvement, which does not happen.”101 Until 2002, no organization held 
the education reform mandate or demonstrated the political will and ability to force 
change and the extent to which the OSCE backed by the OHR will force unpopular 
but necessary changes remains to be seen.  
 
This section will review several reform efforts to provide a framework for considering 
the strengths and weaknesses of these approaches. In addition to summarizing the 
achievements and challenges these various initiatives faced, there is an emphasis on 
the process of reform efforts to explore the dynamics of international and domestic 
involvement and to highlight some examples of how reforms that sound simple in 
theory are negotiated in practice.  
 
A. Reports and Assessments 
It would be impossible to argue that international or domestic authorities were not 
aware of the need for educational reform. There has been no shortage of reports, re-
views, conferences and assessments of the status of, and the need for reform in the 
                                      
100 A significant part of the Dayton negotiations was consumed with territorial issues, as a 51%/49% 
divisions between the two Entities was a priority. See Richard Holbrooke’s To End A War. 
101 Ann Low-Beer, Seminar on History Curricula and Textbooks in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Spon-
sored by the Stability Pact, UNESCO and the Georg Eckert Institute for International Textbook Re-
search, 5-8 April 2001. 
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education sector in BiH. Each of these details problems and provides implementation 
plans and proposals. The following list includes several of the more extensive reports 
compiled and conferences organized: 
· The Education Sector in Bosnia Herzegovina and Possible Long-term Options for 
Educational Policy, Planning and Development Assistance, prepared by Seth 
Spaulding (UNICEF Consultant) and Rob Fuderich (UNICEF Education Officer), 
November 1994.  
· Situation Analysis of Educational Services for Children in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina, prepared by Srebren Dizdar for UNICEF, November 1996.  
· The Curricula of the “National Subjects” in Bosnia and Hercegovina, prepared by 
Volker Lenhart for UNESCO, 1999. 
· SFOR CIMIC102 Development Conference Series – Education in BiH, 12 October 
1999. 
· Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration, 
Prepared by the COE (on behalf of the World Bank), 10 November 1999. 
· A Project Appraisal Document for an Education Development Project, prepared 
by the World Bank, 19 April 2000. 
· Rebuilding a Common Future: for a Critical Approach to History Teaching, Or-
ganized by the COE, OHR, and Federation Ministry of Education, Science, Cul-
ture and Sport, May 2000. 
· Seminar on History Curricula and Textbooks in BiH, organized by the Stability 
Pact for South Eastern Europe, UNESCO and the Georg Eckert Institute for Inter-
national Textbook Research, Sarajevo, April 2001. 
· Summary Report on the State of Protection of the Right of the Child in the Federa-
tion of BiH, Ombudsmen of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7 May 
2001.  
· Thematic Review of National Policies for Education – Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
OECD, 27 September 2001. 
· Basis for the Educational Politics and Strategic Development of Education in the 
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, BiH Federation Ministry of Education, 
Science Culture and Sport, September 2001. 
                                      
102 NATO Stabilisation Force Civil Military Co-operation task force. 
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In addition to these publications and events focusing specifically on the case of BiH, 
there have been other region-wide conferences on the topic. For example, in 1999 BiH 
representatives attended meetings of the Southeastern European Ministers of Educa-
tion, adopting a declaration committing to reform and cooperation.103 Although basic 
information concerning the need for reform in BiH and the region was forthcoming, 
the will to systematically address the problem by short-sighted BiH politicians or re-
luctant international authorities and develop a coordinated plan for action backed by 
the financial, political and diplomatic currency needed to move any reform ahead in 
BiH was generally absent.  
 
According to COE and World Bank figures, between 1996 and 1998, $172 million 
was spent on education (out of a total $3.8 billion overall).104 However, the education 
commitment declined in each of these years: $110 million in 1996, $49 million in 
1997, and $13 million in 1998. This funding supported school reconstruction, training, 
supplies and expert assessment and consultation during the emergency response phase 
of the early post-war period. While the spending was really a drop in the proverbial 
bucket, particularly when including the costs of physical repairs and reconstruction, it 
too illustrates that there was at least a minimal appreciation of the need for educa-
tional support from the beginning of the post-war effort. 
 
The following sections review several efforts at both policy-oriented and technical 
reform. The information is roughly chronological, though organized according to five 
sections that represent various reform phases and lead actors. First, efforts organized 
by the OHR are reviewed to illustrate the initial environment for reform and early 
steps toward change. Next, the EC-TAER SMS programme is examined in depth as 
an example of a significant technical reform effort. Third, several additional, targeted 
assistance and reform efforts are briefly reviewed to demonstrate the range of activi-
ties that have been pursued by individual agencies. Fourth, the Brčko model or ‘ex-
                                      
103 Education for Democratic Development and Stability in South-east Europe: Informal Conference of 
Ministers of Education from South-East Europe, Council of Europe, 2-3 December 1999, Strasbourg. A 
meeting was also held in Sofia in November 1999. 
104 Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration, 20. A report pre-
pared for the May 1999 Donor’s Conference co-hosted by the European Commission and the World 
Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1996-1998 Lessons and Accomplishment, Review of the Priority Re-
construction Program, states that $192 million was committed and $144 million disbursed between 
1996-1998. 
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perience’ is considered, as its reform efforts have proceeded independently of reform 
in the entities. Finally, the OSCE’s formal mandate will be explored, together with a 
status report on progress to date. 
 
B. OHR’s Reform Efforts 
Since its establishment in 1996, the OHR has had no formal education department or 
strong education portfolio. Taken in context this is not surprising, as until mid-to late 
1997 the OHR was relatively resource-constrained, had minimal enforcement capa-
bilities,105 and focused its efforts on those elements of the peace implementation 
clearly delineated in the DPA. OHR had one educational expert on staff, housed 
within the human rights department, working with two Bosnian assistants. An OHR 
education expert who worked on the issue for three years (beginning in June 1999) 
notes that while he tried to convince the High Representative of the need for a dedi-
cated education department, educational reform was not seen as a priority at the time 
and he failed to convince him of its importance.106  
 
Despite the lack of a formal education reform mandate, there were voices at high lev-
els calling for reform. The Peace Implementation Council (PIC)107 meeting in Bonn in 
December 1997, called on: 
the competent authorities to work together to ensure that all persons are edu-
cated according to their needs and in a manner which also contributes to toler-
ance and stability within a multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, and to de-
velop without delay an education programme consistent with these principles, 
in co-operation with the High Representative, UNESCO, the Council of 
Europe, the European Commission, the OSCE, UNICEF, the World Bank and 
other relevant organizations.108   
 
                                      
105 At the Bonn Peace Implementation Conference, 10 December 1997, the powers of the High Repre-
sentative were significantly expanded: “The Council welcomes the High Representative’s intention to 
use his final authority in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementa-
tion of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties by making binding deci-
sions, as he judges necessary, on the following issues…” Conference Conclusions, XI, 2. 
106 Personal interview, Claude Kieffer, Sarajevo, February 2003. 
107 The PIC Steering Board provides the High Representative with political guidance. 
108 PIC Bonn Conclusions, I (d). 
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Although an admirable proclamation, in reality this was more of a request than a de-
mand, and neither a mandate nor necessary resources supported these good intentions. 
In the absence of any broad modernization initiative, reform efforts did begin to 
command the attention of representatives of several of the international organizations 
in BiH. From the beginning, reform efforts focused on the most controversial of the 
needed reforms - textbooks (particularly history books) and curriculum reform. Dur-
ing the war, education had become highly politicized and the ethnic separations that 
ensued after the signing of Dayton ensured that students throughout BiH were not 
being educated in an objective or harmonized manner. Textbooks developed by the 
various parties depicted history according to their own interpretations, cultural myths, 
stereotypes and prejudices. Therefore, the ‘cleansing’ of these objectionable elements 
from the texts and curricula used in schools throughout BiH was made a priority. 
While a good intention, however, this focus on the most controversial of possible re-
form efforts politicized discussions of education reform from the beginning.  
 
The OHR’s primary goal in its education work was to influence policy change and 
promote an atmosphere in which education reforms could take place. Its focus was 
policy, and it was not involved in providing or coordinating technical assistance or 
implementation strategies. Together with the COE, the OHR organized conferences of 
the Ministers of Education of both entities and regular meetings and consultations 
with cantonal education ministers in the Federation. Prior to ministerial meetings, 
preparatory policy meetings were organized together with the World Bank, the EU 
and other IOs involved in relevant independent activities.109 Larger meetings of 50-60 
people from the various parties working in educational reform (NGOs, IOs, etc.), re-
ferred to as the Core Education Policy Group, were held approximately every three 
months.110 
 
The PIC Madrid Declaration of December 1998 emphasized content and textbooks 
and called on the entity authorities to develop curricula “which meet international 
standards and contribute to tolerance and stability.”111 Therefore, educational content 
                                      
109 It has been noted that the OSCE was invited to these meetings but was not interested in education 
reform at the time. 
110 No reports for external circulation were developed through these meetings. 
111 Peace Implementation Council, Reinforcing Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina – The Way Ahead. 
Madrid, 16 December 1998, Section II, point 7.  
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issues continued to be the primary focus of the OHR as efforts to remove objection-
able materials and develop a policy that would ensure harmonized curricula were the 
priorities. One of the earliest efforts at textbook reform set the stage for the politiciza-
tion of educational reform and the dominant theme of history texts. It also damaged 
relations between international authorities and BiH politicians and communities, thus 
creating an atmosphere of distrust that would impact the pace of future reform efforts.  
 
Throughout 1998, an initiative aimed at reforming educational practices and textbooks 
in order to promote non-Bosniak return to Sarajevo was initiated by the OHR.112 An 
Education Working Group and a Sub-group on Textbooks were established, consist-
ing of BiH and international participants who worked specifically to address needed 
changes in the Sarajevo educational arena with a focus on eliminating passages from 
Bosniak texts that could be offensive to non-Bosniak returnees. The review process 
was conducted in a quiet manner to avoid raising any eyebrows before the analysis 
was complete. There were no published reports of meeting minutes of interim find-
ings. Although this can be frustrating for researchers, in itself it is not too surprising 
as open discussion of highly controversial issues often thwarts progress before an ini-
tiative even gets off the ground. While it is important to genuinely seek middle ground 
between effective process and public transparency, in this case this balance was not 
found.  
 
UNESCO played a key role in the textbook review process and identified several 
genuinely needed changes. The most controversial recommendation was to omit any 
discussion of the recent violence in Bosnia until an objective interpretation could be 
agreed upon. Issues of definitions of genocide and the identification of victims and 
oppressors were viewed as too politically charged to remain in childrens’ textbooks. 
Unfortunately, the presumably good intentions of the textbook group were 
overshadowed by the non-transparent nature of the review process and the manner in 
which the group’s suggestions were leaked to the press and later manipulated by the 
politicized media, resulting in public rejection of the recommendations. “The OHR’s 
insistence on protracted secrecy, coupled with UNESCO’s ill-conceived release of the 
                                      
112 For an excellent in-depth review of this effort, see Robert Donia, “The Quest for Tolerance in Sara-
jevo’s Textbooks”, (1)2 Human Rights Review, January-March 2000,  38-55.  
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group’s recommendations as mandatory, provided Bosniac political leaders with 
selective instances to use in attacking the Sub-Group’s work.”113 The Sarajevo Canton 
government renounced the group’s conclusions and forbade the implementation of its 
recommendations. An important and early reform initiative had failed and had 
alienated local reform partners. 
 
Despite this setback, the OHR continued to work on the issue of textbooks. An initial 
“Agreement Regarding Textbook Review and Removal of Objectionable Material” 
was signed on 18 May 1998. On 19 July 1999 an “Agreement on the Removal of Ob-
jectionable Material from Textbooks” was signed in Mostar. An “Implementation 
Agreement” based on the July agreement was signed in Banja Luka on 20 August 
1999.114 By signing these agreements the Ministries each agreed to set up a Standing 
Textbook Review Commission that would review texts and suggest revisions. In addi-
tion to immediately removing blatantly objectionable materials from texts, long-term 
goals included replacing texts produced in Zagreb and Belgrade that used Croatia and 
the FRY as the frame of reference with new texts developed for BiH.   
 
Spot checks were conducted to monitor compliance, conducted by OHR, SFOR’s 
CIMIC Task Force, ECMM, OSCE and UNESCO. A report issued on implementation 
status through 30 December 1999 noted that in general the agreement “was better and 
more fully implemented in primary than in secondary schools, and in the Federation 
than in the RS”, with schools using the Bosniak curriculum having the highest rate of 
compliance. The highest rates of non-compliance were in Serb schools in the eastern 
RS. The report highlighted the fact that many objectionable texts had only partially 
been deleted due to the use of light markers (or in some cases highlighters), and re-
ported that with different editions of texts being used it was at times difficult to moni-
tor compliance according to the agreed-upon texts.115  
 
                                      
113 Ibid. 
114 For the text of these agreements, see 
http://storch.gei.de/seenet/states/bih/textbook_revision_process.htm#seeregionsboheagr2. 
115 “Draft Preliminary Report: Textbook Review (Spot Check) Monitoring” as of 30 December 1999. 
The findings noted in this report were based on reports and remarks form ECMM, OSCE and OHR, as 
no SFOR, CIMIC, or UNESCO reports were received.  
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In addition to the work on textbooks, initial steps were taken in support of broader 
curricular reform in the Federation. In September 1999 the five Bosniak cantons used 
a curricula in which 70 per cent of the material would be the same, with 30 per cent to 
be developed by cantonal authorities presumably in the national subjects. Cooperation 
and coordination among the other cantonal ministers was particularly challenging, 
because in spite of the costs of multiple parallel systems, there was little desire among 
the minority Bosnian Croat entities to cede educational control to the Federation. This 
obstruction continued until the defeat of the third entity movement orchestrated by 
nationalist Bosnian Croats in spring 2001, which ushered in a more cooperative ap-
proach to reform.  
 
At a February 2000 symposium on curriculum reform, organized by OHR and at-
tended by the Ministries of Education, education experts, IOs and NGOs, options sup-
porting the goal of a harmonized curricula were presented and discussed. For instance, 
the Swiss model was identified as a potential model for BiH. There was also a pro-
posal that “each constituent people should offer modules that would be integrated into 
the curriculum of the others, especially for culture, language and literature.”116 While 
they would not be exchanged among the other constituent peoples, the module con-
cept would essentially become the national group subject curricula approach used as 
the basis for reform efforts in 2002 to 2003. 
 
On 10 May 2000, at a meeting of the Conference of the Ministers of Education of 
BiH, attended by the OHR, COE, UNESCO and others, the parties agreed to a series 
of steps aimed at harmonizing the segregated education systems.117 The agreement 
defined “concrete steps toward a co-ordinated education system, respecting ethnic 
differences”,118 and “the elimination of any forms of segregation in the current educa-
tional systems.”119 Key points included: 
· Continued review of textbooks and elimination of objectionable materials by the 
Independent Commission for Textbook Review 
                                      
116 Human Development Report Bosnian and Herzegovina Youth, UN Development Programme, 2000, 
17.  
117 The Agreement was signed by Fahrudin Rizvanbegović, Minister of Education, in the FBiH, Nenad 
Suzić, Minister of Education in the RS, and Ivo Miro Jović, Deputy Minister of Education in the FBiH. 
118 Prof. (hon.) Dr. Paul Roeders, “Towards a Sector Development Program…”, 3. 
119 From EC-TAER  promotional brochure.  
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· The establishment of a Curriculum Harmonization Board (CHB), to reform and 
coordinate curriculum reform 
· Development of curricular modules addressing the national group of subjects and 
reflecting national minorities 
· Introduction of a course on world religions and replacement of Civic Defense with 
Human Rights and Civic Education studies 
 
The first three points continued to be discussed and debated, but no final approach for 
implementation was agreed. In contrast, the fourth point was more immediately 
achieved as coursework in Human Rights and Civic Education replaced Civil Defense 
in the first and second-year secondary school syllabus in September 2001.120  
 
An additional agreement on textbook review, signed in Jahorina on 14 December 
2001, further outlined a reform process and the goals of review. In June 2002 the en-
tity ministries provided the results of their analysis of the textbooks to OHR, and the 
Textbook Commissions meeting in July to further exchange information, just over 
three years after the initial textbook agreements were signed in 1999. The slow pace 
of progress illustrates that the MOEs and BiH authorities were not seriously interested 
in implementing reform, and in the absence of IC pressure backed by strong enforce-
ment mechanisms, could significantly stall the process. 
 
From 22-23 January 2002 the OHR organized a roundtable on education, which was 
attended by approximately 100 people. The roundtable included a discussion of the 
Brčko model of educational reform that had been imposed by the Brčko supervisor in 
June 2001. Principal Deputy High Representative (PDHR) Ambassador Donald Hays 
announced that OHR was inaugurating a “Learning Partnerships” public information 
campaign to increase awareness of the importance of education and education reform 
for all citizens, identifying best practices and encouraging local ownership in re-
form.121 Later that month, on 29 January the cantonal and entity ministers again 
agreed to more closely coordinate their reform efforts. 
                                      
120 OHR Speech, January 22, 2002. The coursework was designed and implemented by the US-funded 
CIVITAS project. 
121 Speech by Principal Deputy High Representative Donald Hays to an OHR-sponsored Conference on 
Education in BiH. OHR Speech, Sarajevo, 22 January 2002. See http://www.ohr.int/ohr-
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Considering the political and social environment in which these reforms took place 
and the sensitive nature of educational reform, particularly curricular and textbook 
issues, these achievements were important steps forward. However, systemic weak-
nesses prevented these successes from having a deeper impact. First, while entity au-
thorities signed agreements and made general statements proclaiming cooperation, 
compliance with and implementation of these pronouncements was absent or uneven. 
In the absence of real initiative on the part of the BiH authorities for change, harmo-
nized laws that could regulate educational issues, or a High Representative willing to 
“sack” authorities obstructing the process and impose necessary legislation, there was 
a limit to the progress that could be made. However, without a stronger mandate to 
lead reform and the financial and moral commitment needed to realize such measures, 
a dedicated and enforced approach was politically impossible. 
 
Additionally, the focus on controversial content reform issues and the emphasis on 
policy reform rather than technical assistance focused the debate exclusively on na-
tional subjects and textbooks - two of the most politicized topics in the education 
process. Other reforms needed in any post-Cold War transitional society – teacher 
training, pedagogical reform, administration and management, etc. – were left unad-
dressed. Although independent efforts to tackle these issues were underway, they 
were not a primary focus and were not a part of an overall modernization plan. Addi-
tionally, while a comprehensive public information or awareness campaign could 
have helped to raise the profile of the effort, increased transparency and better in-
formed the public of the need for reform, no such campaign was developed. Unfortu-
nately, there was no single actor interested in a broad education awareness campaign 
that could drive and coordinate these various efforts. However, these observations are 
not so much criticisms of the individuals driving these reforms attempts as they are 
reflective of the limitations of reform in the absence of a real mandate and political 
support by BiH or IC authorities. 
  
                                                                                                          
dept/presso/presssp/default.asp?content_id=6766. The proposed “Learning Partnerships” campaign did 
not materialize. 
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C. EC-TAER and the SMS  
EC-TAER’s contributions to education reform have addressed a broad set of reform 
needs as technical support has been provided for initiatives related to higher and voca-
tional education, standards and assessment practices and primary and secondary 
school reform. Primary and secondary school reform in itself encompasses a diverse 
range of issues including teacher training, legislation development, curricular reform 
and educational management practices. It is therefore the most comprehensive coordi-
nated reform effort implemented prior to the OSCE’s assumption of the reform man-
date. 
 
The EC-TAER SMS (Shared Modernization Strategy) project, focusing on basic re-
form, modernization and development of primary and secondary education throughout 
BiH, provided a foundation for work that continues in 2003 under the OSCE mandate. 
This section will examine the SMS project in some detail because the SMS experience 
provides an interesting case study through which to better understand the challenges 
of promoting local ownership of reform, as well as to explore the relationships among 
the various IOs working on educational reform issues in BiH. First, the genesis and 
evolution of the general EC-TAER and specific SMS projects will be reviewed to 
provide an understanding of how goals were set and priorities developed. Second, the 
implementation of the SMS will be summarized to illustrate not only the end-product 
of the initiative, but the process that led to the development of a set of recommenda-
tions. This process will be further illustrated by a closer review of one of the SMS 
working groups to highlight the challenges facing the participants in the reform effort. 
Finally, the strengths and weaknesses of the SMS effort will be presented, together 
with an analysis of what worked and what did not work and some lessons to be 
learned.122  
 
1. The Genesis of the SMS 
The EC-TAER educational reform project was an ambitious initiative that evolved as 
the project was proposed, developed and implemented. Beginning on 1 November 
                                      
122 Terms of Reference for “An Evaluation of EC-financed Support to the Education Sector in BiH” 
were released in late 2002 and will provide a formal evaluation of the effort. 
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2000, the programme’s goal was “to bring the education system in BiH on par with 
European standards”123 by coordinating reform efforts in four broad areas: 
1. Support to the development of a Standards and Assessment Agency (SAA) 
2. Institutional Development and Policy Advice 
3. Higher Education (including the Higher Education Co-ordination Board) 
4. European School Networking 
It is interesting to note that the SMS as it would eventually emerge was not initially a 
distinct part of the EC-TAER project inception report.124 The activities in support of 
point 2, Institutional Development and Policy Advice, were the most closely related to 
the SMS that would emerge and were originally intended to focus on two efforts: the 
Curriculum Harmonization Board (CHB) established through the work of OHR and 
the 10 May Agreement, and a programme to cooperate with the OHR in support of 
multiethnic primary education reform in Brčko. This initial plan underwent significant 
changes throughout 2001 and 2002. Component 4 (European Networking) eventually 
disappeared as its three sub-components were dropped from late November 2001 to 
June 2002, with these resources to be reallocated to the SMS effort.125 However, the 
more significant change, in terms of content and process, concerned the CHB and the 
ultimate development of the SMS.  
 
Initial meetings of the CHB held in late 2000 and early 2001 were poorly attended and 
the BiH representatives - all political appointees - were not proactive, productive or 
even committed to reform. As illustrated by the Sarajevo textbook review experience, 
as long as the politicians and majority constituencies in a region were satisfied with 
biased mono-perspecitve texts and content and were reluctant to seek common 
ground, a cooperative process of reform would be difficult. EC-TAER reported to the 
EC that the CHB “turned out to be mainly an instrument for political pressure to be 
exerted by the OHR and the COE, and has been, at least with its present composition, 
                                      
123 EC-TAER website at http://www.ec-taer.org.ba/aboutus/indexe.htm. 
124 The EC-TAER activities conducted from 2001-2002 consisted of the following elements: the SMS, 
the Standards and Assessment (SAA), support to Brčko district primary education and higher education 
support. The EC provided approximately EUR 19.3m for Education Sector support in BiH, of which 
10m was allocated to the EC Tempus program. The SMS effort received approximately EUR 1.5m for 
23 months of work. Terms of Reference, “An Evaluation of EC-financed Support to the Education Sec-
tor in BiH”, 2002.  The TEMPUS program, which focuses on higher education, is not managed through 
the BiH EC-TAER administration, but by the Brussels Office. 
125 Hugh Glanville, personal interview, Sarajevo, November 2002. 
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a dysfunctional body.”126 While the international actors were committed to reform, if 
their local partners were not and reforms could or would not simply be imposed by the 
IC, progress would be difficult, if not impossible. The proposed work on curriculum 
harmonization illustrated that in spite of several years of work on the issue, sufficient 
progress had not been made and both political will and support for change – among 
BiH and international authorities – were lacking.  
 
Reform efforts focusing on non-political change could potentially help to break the 
stalemate. The EC-TAER Inception Report proposed that the focus of the CHB should 
not be to strictly define a detailed curriculum, but to define ‘core competencies’ to 
ensure that all students complete schooling with the skill set required to become pro-
ductive members of society. An additional emphasis was placed on replacing the tra-
ditional memorization approach with a system that placed a priority on ‘learning for 
understanding’. This approach, including learning and teaching methods and a wider 
curricular process, was suggested to avoid as much ‘political polarization’ as possi-
ble.127 This was a tacit acknowledgement that previous efforts had focused too heavily 
on the political issues at the expense of more achievable (and vitally necessary) tech-
nical reform.   
 
As it became increasingly evident that the work of the CHB, couched in politics and 
issues of curriculum and national identity, would not be a productive or viable ap-
proach, proposals for a broader primary and secondary reform initiative began to take 
shape. To replace the CHB initiative under a programme capable of addressing more 
than just curricular issues, EC-TAER proposed a programme of reform that would 
address five inter-related issues: curriculum reform, teacher training, educational ad-
ministration and management, special and inclusive education and legal and structural 
reforms. A concept document outlining the proposal was drafted in April and May 
2001 and reviewed by local and international actors.128    
 
                                      
126 Noted by Glanville, personal interview, Sarajevo, November 2002.  
127 Roeders and Glanville, Inception Report, 31 January 2001, 41. 
128 Prof. (hon.) Dr Paul Roeders, Towards a Sector Development Program in BiH General Education: 
Proposal for the Elaboration of a ‘Shared Strategy” for a Modernisation of Primary and General Sec-
ondary Education in Bosnia-Herzegovina, EC Technical Assistance to Education Reform in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina Concept Paper, 31 May 2001.  
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Highlights of the intent of the SMS programme, as outlined in the May 2001 proposal 
included the following: 
· Realize education for all in BiH, with a system on par with European standards 
· Encourage concerted input from the IC in support of the education sector through 
a sector-wide approach integrating all stakeholders 
· Expectation of full ownership of the programme by local education authorities 
· Support for a ‘curriculum framework’ rather than a prescriptive curriculum, to 
allow for regional adaptations129 
The time frame for the project was broken down into three phases – preparation, im-
plementation and consolidation. In order to encourage a long-term outlook and lasting 
impact, the project was developed for a medium to long-term timeframe.130  
 
The May 2001 concept paper also noted a clearly defined need for “a well designed 
public information campaign”, to ensure that the public was aware of and would sup-
port the effort: “The whole process should be accompanied by an intensive public 
information campaign (to be prepared and accompanied by a special working group) 
to inform all stakeholders, but especially teachers and parents about the ongoing mod-
ernization, its necessity, advantages and consequences.”131 This had been lacking in 
the previous efforts to date. A more transparent process could help to avoid the poten-
tial misunderstandings of the goals and process and possibly make the issue less open 
to manipulation by the media and politicians.  
 
EC TAER would administer the SMS programme in place of the CHB.132 The pro-
posed working method would emphasize an inclusive approach to ensure local par-
ticipation and include a coordination board, an advisory committee, five sub-
committees and 12 working groups comprised of teachers and education specialists 
from BiH. Study tours designed to enable participants to visit countries in transition 
                                      
129 Ibid.  
130 The preparation phase was originally estimated to last from early 2001-mid 2002, the implementa-
tion phases planned for mid-2002 to mid-2004 and the consolidation phase from mid-2004 onwards.  
131Prof. (hon.) Dr. Paul Roeders,  “Towards a Sector Development Program…” , concept paper, final 
version, 31 May 2001, 10. However, in personal interviews it was noted that EC-TAER’s plans for an 
information campaign conflicted with OHR’s own plans. No common approach emerged and there was 
no campaign until the OSCE assumed the mandate in 2002. 
132 EC-TAER’s resources included a main office in Sarajevo with seven staff members (two interna-
tional experts and five BiH staff), and an office in Banja Luka with two BiH staff members. Long- and 
short-term experts were brought in as necessary for specific support.   
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and witness first hand their approaches to education reform were suggested and the 
support of NGOs and project donors was recommended and requested. With this basic 
approach in mind, the project was presented to local and international authorities.  
 
Although this was certainly the most comprehensive plan for reform, implementation 
and technical support in post-Dayton BiH to date, the SMS, and the role of EC-TAER 
in implementing the SMS, was burdened from its inception by a lack of support from 
the IC. Such support was critical, not only for practical implementation, but for the 
display of coordinated international effort needed to force reluctant BiH authorities to 
make changes. The disbandment of the CHB, which had been created by OHR and 
supported by the COE, set the scene for interagency tensions and an often uncoopera-
tive working environment. This was demonstrated very early on by a letter sent by the 
COE with the support of the OHR in mid-June 2001 to EC-TAER suggesting that the 
SMS plan, to be signed and officially inaugurated on 27 June, was premature. The 
letter also noted that the CHB could not be dissolved by EC-TAER because the edu-
cation mandate was in fact held by OHR.133  
 
Despite these disagreements, from 27-29 June 2001 the inaugural conference for the 
SMS effort was held in Jahorina near Sarajevo, and the SMS implementation plan was 
signed by Dr. Gojko Savanović (Minister of Education of the RS) and Dr. Mujo 
Demirović (Minister of Education, Science, Culture and Sport in the Federation of 
BiH). Officials from many of the IOs working on education activities made statements 
of support and signed the attendance book.134 However, as the plan began to be im-
plemented, the lack of cooperative spirit among the key international players was 
clear. 
 
2. Implementation 
In addition to the official inauguration and signature ceremony, the June Jahorina 
meeting provided time for the first working session of the SMS members. Working 
groups for the five main themes, with 20 to 30 people in each group, met to discuss 
their issue areas together with national and international facilitators, and develop a 
                                      
133 Personal interview, Hugh Glanville, Sarajevo, November 2002. 
134 Representative organizations included the EC, UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank, OHR, COE, the 
Open Society Fund and others.  
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SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis. Facilitators were 
considered to be a key element of the effort to ensure full local ownership and partici-
pation, and a group of national and international facilitators received basic training, 
which was later supplemented by more intensive facilitation skills training seminars. 
Facilitators were utilized to encourage brainstorming, focus discussions, mediate 
problems or debates and help groups to develop focused action-oriented tasks.  
 
This meeting provided a first look at some of the challenges the project coordinators 
and participants faced. For example, while the five noted sub-committees facilitated 
the organized breakdown into working groups, the amount of overlap among the top-
ics became clear from the start. Inclusive and special needs education and curriculum 
framework development would be affected by teacher training progress, educational 
management and teacher training would also be linked and everything would be af-
fected by the results of legal and support system reform. Progress in one group would 
aid progress in another and difficulties in one group could reverberate and potentially 
impede progress in the others. 
 
A post-conference debriefing of the working group facilitators revealed both positive 
and negative comments, as well as additional challenges: 
What some facilitators did not like about the groups was that listening to each 
other was a problem, discussion should have been shorter, political issues ob-
structed productive work, and positions from the Republika Srpska were rigid. 
One of the groups was said to be divided in opinion, with huge differences be-
tween Entity representatives. For some facilitators the unfamiliar methods 
were obstacles.135  
Participatory and cooperative working methods were new to the participants and led 
to difficulties with basic workshop processes such as brainstorming. 
 
The political and legal obstacles to effective implementation of technical reform also 
became clear from this inaugural meeting. In a very honest epilogue to the conference 
                                      
135 A Shared Strategy for the Modernization of Primary and General Secondary Education in BiH, 
Report of the Inaugural Conference, 27-30 June 2001, Jahorina, BiH, 19.  
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report, Paul Roeders addressed the difficulties of moving forward with technical re-
form in the absence of a suitable political environment and legal framework:   
If this signifies that the modernization process of the education system has to 
be within the limits of the present laws in BiH, it is not an element to be taken 
into account, but a lethal threat to the process. In a democratic society, the law 
should be adapted to new, required developments in the systems that together 
form the society, and not the other way around…..If the SMS has to limit itself 
to stay within the limits of the present legal system, we better don’t start the 
process at all, because it will never achieve its major objective.136 
A ‘chicken and egg’ scenario, in which technical solutions might not be proposed 
without confirmation of a legal framework and legal solutions might not be proposed 
based on needed reforms due to political imperatives, would often result in stalemate, 
particularly in terms of the detailed, implementation-oriented suggestions envisioned 
for the effort. 
 
From November 2001 through June 2002, a total of six multi-day SMS workshops 
were held to define goals, suggest strategies and develop plans for implementation.137 
The plan was for all of this input and feedback to be developed into a final report of 
recommendations to be handed to the Entity MOEs for review and implementation. 
Over 100 working group participants from throughout BiH (including Brčko) were 
included among 12 working groups comprised of teachers, experts employed by the 
Entity or Cantonal Ministries of Education, Pedagogical Institutes, Faculties, Teach-
ers’ Unions, Institutes for Special Education and others.138  
 
The EC-TAER SMS organizers charged with implementing this project wanted to 
ensure that the education ministers and authorities had full buy-in to, and ownership 
of the process to minimize potential obstruction or difficulties as the project pro-
gressed. In addition, this would ensure that the final results and recommendations 
were seen as the product of work by BiH experts, rather than externally imposed 
ideas. Therefore, selection of SMS project participants was an important first step. 
                                      
136 Ibid, 22. 
137 The meetings were held in Neum (13-16 November 2001), Teslić (18-21 February 2002), Ilidza (13-
16 March 2002), Banja Luka (21-24 April 2002), Teslić (22-25 May 2002), and Tuzla (15-18 June 
2002). 
138 Report of the First SMS Workshop, November 12-15, Neum, 2001, 5. 
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The organizers had originally envisioned a participant selection process in which it 
would receive and review applications for working group members submitted by the 
professionals themselves (teachers, educational administrators, pedagogues, etc.) and 
then pass a list of recommended candidates to the Entity Ministries for review, com-
ment and acceptance. Formal approval of the working group members by the Minis-
tries was assumed to be a way of ensuring that working group members could partici-
pate and make decisions with the backing and support of the Ministries that would 
ultimately implement these ideas.  
 
Ultimately, however, the MOEs insisted on a procedure whereby they simply ap-
pointed individuals for working group participation and EC-TAER was not in a posi-
tion to challenge this demand. The appointment process was slow and driven by BiH 
politics, and the 12 working groups were not finally developed until October 2001. 
The selection procedure, unlike an application approach, also eliminated the quality 
controls of a more stringent screening process and made it less likely that profession-
als interested in applying to participate, yet not politically connected, would be se-
lected.  
 
The six workshops were well executed and provide a useful case study in workshop 
facilitation and encouraging local ownership of processes and methods, but they failed 
to have the desired results due to a lack of political will. The workshop environment 
included a mix of large and small group work, with small group work led by recently 
trained local facilitators. International and Bosnian experts presented working papers 
to guide the discussions of each of the five key areas. Study visits to Hungary, Slove-
nia and Romania provided first-hand experience and observation of best practices. 
Each workshop was structured according to daily goals outlined in worksheets and 
matrices, which the working group participants would work on together in order to 
develop ideas on paper, finalize them on computer and distribute this work to the five 
thematic sections for review, approval and adoption. Evaluations of each workshop 
ensured space for feedback and helped guide changes for subsequent meetings. How-
ever, in spite of this work plan and approach - something critical was missing. 
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3. The Case of Working Group 4.3 
Working group 4.3, Integration of Minority Returnees (within the Inclusion and Spe-
cial Needs Education theme), provides an interesting example of the limitations of this 
well-intended approach. While every working group was plagued by an element of 
politics, the group working on the issue of returnee integration was uniquely posi-
tioned to either make suggestions that would facilitate significant progress, or become 
bogged down in politics and narrow-minded nationalism. Return has been a key prior-
ity of the IC in BiH, as Annex 7 of the DPA guaranteed citizens the right to return to 
their pre-war homes. While this is regarded as a basic human rights protection by its 
supporters, this right to return was viewed by many as an attempt to reverse the ethnic 
cleansing that had sought to create homogenous regions throughout BiH. Opponents 
of the re-creation of a diverse country therefore sought to minimize the potential for 
successful return by obstructionist activities designed to cement division, rather than 
build bridges. 
 
The working group was weakly staffed from the beginning which reflected either a 
lack of interest on behalf of the appointing MOEs, or a decision by MOEs to pur-
posely adopt an approach designed to stifle progress on the politically charged issue 
of minority integration. The four participants (most other working groups had a stand-
ing membership of six to ten ) included the Assistant Minister for Primary and Secon-
dary Education of Tuzla Canton, the Deputy Principal of a primary school in Drvar, 
the Supervisor of the RS Pedagogical Institute Regional Unit in Bijeljina and a parent 
from Banja Luka. The participants were all over the age of 45 and all male, exhibiting 
a demographic composition that did not necessarily preclude, but certainly did not 
promote, highly innovative and creative work. The working group participant selec-
tion procedure unfortunately minimized the SMS project coordinator’s room for pro-
test as the MOE’s demanded the right to appoint the participants they chose. 
 
As a further setback, the expert discussion paper on inclusive education presented at 
the first workshop in Neum focused only on children with special needs, thus neglect-
ing specific issues pertaining to returnees or minority inclusion.139 This in some ways 
                                      
139  Mileva Mandìc, “Overview of the Situation and Problems in the Education of Children and Young 
People with Special Needs”, 2001,Prijedor. 
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illustrated that returnee issues, while certainly a part of inclusive education, would not 
receive the specific attention and profile needed for such a politicized topic, further 
illustrating the enormous gap among 4.3 and the other working groups. It was also an 
interesting test case for measuring the role of the EC-TAER personnel and the will of 
the IC as a whole in order to measure their commitment to substantive reform sugges-
tions. 
 
At the second SMS workshop in Teslić, the working group agreed on the need for a 
regulatory/legal framework, and suggested support for joint sports and competitions 
organized by the local community to facilitate informal friendships among children of 
different backgrounds. The group insisted that they could not do anything about regu-
lations or legislation pertaining to returnee integration, as they felt that was the re-
sponsibility of the legal framework working groups. Rather than propose their own 
specific legal and regulatory recommendations, they chose to focus on activities that 
could support and encourage returnee children to socialize together. At the third 
workshop in March, recreational sporting activities and competitions were again dis-
cussed, together with the broad goal of educating the local community.  
 
At the fourth workshop, held in Banja Luka in April, little had substantively changed 
since the initial proposals and discussions in Neum and Teslić and outside interna-
tional observers and facilitators had been invited to join the group to introduce a new 
perspective.140 When challenged to try to think of other solutions for returnee integra-
tion, the working group members insisted that recreational activities (primarily sports) 
would be the best solution as friendships would serve as the basis for inclusion (gen-
der issues had not apparently been considered by the group). When asked to elaborate 
on their suggestions, perhaps by developing a plan for how such activities could be 
organized, how teachers and coaches could be recruited and trained to ensure partici-
pation of returnees and other details that were the purpose of the workshop, one of the 
members noted that such details “were the responsibility of the authorities”, illustrat-
ing the mindset that precluded real progress. At one point in the discussion significant 
time was devoted to issues concerning protection of the Croatian language, demon-
                                      
140 An observer from the OSCE sat in on several of the sessions and the author provided input and sug-
gestions. The general SMS coordinators sought to rotate through all of the working groups to provide 
encouragement and assess progress, and Dr. Roeders spent some time with working group 4.3. 
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strating that identity issues continued to permeate every aspect of reform and could 
effectively hijack concrete suggestions for progress. The female facilitator, while 
well-intentioned, was newly trained in the art of facilitation and unable to push recal-
citrant participants towards meaningful goals and conclusions.  
 
The recommendations finally proposed in the First Report presented on 27 June 2002 
were general in theme and content and reflective of the Interim Agreement on Re-
turnee Integration that had in the meantime been adopted in March 2002 (largely 
through the initiative of the OSCE). They also could have been articulated in the first 
SMS workshop as they reflected commonly held generalizations rather than specific 
implementation strategies: 
· Education of the local community through workshops, lectures and the media 
· Sport, science and ecological activities 
· An analysis of the current status of returnee integration 
· Entitlement to a curriculum that includes the ‘national subjects’ 
· Development of networks between NGOs, IOs and schools 
· Encouragement of community involvement 
· Employment of returnee teachers141 
 
Other groups were more adequately staffed and had more success, though all faced 
their share of challenges. It has been noted that the most challenging working group 
was the legal framework group, which allowed itself to become bogged down in de-
tails rather than developing a general framework of norms and specifications. Instead 
of focusing on what would specifically not be allowed under a broad umbrella of hu-
man rights protections, preoccupation with minor details impeded progress.142 This 
was to a large extent caused by different interpretations of the purpose of the Shared 
Strategy as an effort that would cross entities, and reflected the concerns that reform 
efforts would seek to reduce entity competence in education in favour of increased 
state level control. Additionally, after a COE “Draft of the Legal Framework on Edu-
cation in Bosnia and Herzegovina” was presented to the group for consideration, the 
groups’ activity slowed again as participants debated the details yet were unable to 
                                      
141 First Report to the Ministers of Education in BiH, 27 June 2002, 19. 
142 Personal interview, Paul Roeders, Sarajevo, June 2002. 
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make specific recommendations for consideration and adoption by the MOEs. Coop-
eration and coordination between the SMS working group and the COE/OHR legal 
effort was not always optimal during this process.  
 
The curriculum working group realized some success as the group agreed to make 
compulsory education last nine years and supported a modernized approach based on 
learning outcomes and related reforms in teacher training. The curriculum reform ef-
fort was guided by a UNESCO education expert who helped to drive the process and 
who later served as a short-term interim education director at the OSCE after its re-
ceipt of the mandate. These were important steps forward, particularly on an issue that 
could have easily been sidelined by the debate over the ‘national subjects’ and pro-
vided a solid foundation for further work.   
 
It is important to acknowledge that it is often an achievement to simply gather people 
together in a discussion forum and agree to broad norms, general suggestions and the 
need for future meetings. The reality of contemporary BiH is that steps must be made 
incrementally over time. However, the SMS framework provided resources, an oppor-
tunity for more specific and focused work, and a chance for the development of a de-
tailed action plan for harmonized implementation of these ideas. It was unfortunate 
that the participants in 4.3 were not truly focused on change and progress and were 
not prepared or interested in challenging the current system. Rather than being moti-
vated and forward-looking reformers, the participants were functionaries of the 
MOEs, unwilling to challenge the current policies and practices, and certainly reluc-
tant to present the MOEs with bold initiatives designed to put pressure on politicians 
for action. 
 
4. Strengths and Weaknesses  
At the 27 June 2002 official presentation of the first SMS report in Sarajevo, Ambas-
sador Robert Beecroft, Head of Mission of the OSCE MBiH said “if the SMS did not 
exist, it would have to be invented.” The SMS programme was successful in bringing 
together a large group of local participants over a sustained period of time to discuss 
the issue of large-scale education reform and modernization and begin to formulate 
recommendations and steps forward. This in itself is no small feat in BiH, where there 
is often little dialogue among communities. In a post-conflict society in need of small 
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steps towards understanding and reconciliation, sustained dialogues can lay the foun-
dation for expanded future negotiations. 
 
In terms of short- and long-term goals, this was a good step forward for the ‘prepara-
tion phase’ of the project and a good starting point for the envisioned four-year im-
plementation and consolidation phases that would operationalize these recommenda-
tions from 2003 to 2006. While participants were often unschooled, unfamiliar and 
uncomfortable with the participatory processes at the heart of the workshops, com-
mitment to a locally driven process ensured that ideas were generated from among 
BiH experts and participants, despite the fact that it often slowed down the pace of 
progress in the eyes of reformers seeking faster change. The process, including work-
shops, expert advice and study visits were all a part of a programme of activities de-
signed to ensure maximum local understanding of the issue and space to consider po-
tential solutions.  
 
Perhaps the SMS’s biggest strength was its focus on all areas of education and reform, 
not just on issues of curricula and textbooks. This approach integrated the general 
transition needs of all post-Cold War countries, rather than solely focusing on reforms 
needed in the wake of the war. By expanding the dialogue to address broad areas of 
reform, the SMS helped to shape the current educational mandate. As the EC will 
continue to provide support to new working groups established by the OSCE, long-
term implementation success should be viewed and assessed in the future based on 
this initial preparation phase. 
 
The weaknesses of the effort can be broken down into mandate and politics, which 
themselves are closely intertwined. The lack of sincere buy-in to the SMS process 
among some members of the IC in BiH and the dynamics of interpersonal relation-
ships among many of the players created an environment in which interagency coop-
eration was weak from the start. The dissolution of the Curriculum Harmonization 
Board and the assumption by EC-TAER of responsibilities that the OHR had previ-
ously held led to unfortunate ‘turf battles’ and competing agendas. Individual experts 
in every organization had an interest in promoting reform, but did not always agree on 
the methods selected or the roles assigned.  
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The lack of agreement over who held the mandate for reform also had an impact. 
While the EC-TAER programme and SMS project were large-scale activities, the EC 
never held a firm mandate for educational reform and therefore had to depend on ad 
hoc agreements of support with the other players. Expectations (some might say 
hopes) that other stakeholders would provide assistance and support to the SMS effort 
went unfulfilled, as aside from the general Jahorina Agreement, there were no official 
agreements or Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) among the IOs stating that they 
would commit to the effort. Whether this was a result of reluctance among the EC-
TAER team to integrate too many stakeholders or due to the political imperatives 
driving all of the IOs in BiH is difficult to measure. However, the impact, in terms of 
cooperation, support, funding and resources was clear, and the IC did not consistently 
present a unified front to the BiH reformers or the resolve to ensure that words and 
promises would be turned into real reform. 
 
The lack of these formal arrangements resulted in a situation in which the SMS coor-
dinators were authorized to provide technical assistance, but had no ability to push or 
force political decisions often needed to ensure implementation of technical reform. 
While technical solutions could be suggested, they could not be developed into viable 
implementation plans in an environment in which the local BiH partners were often 
reluctant participants in reform. EC-TAER could not single-handedly bridge the pol-
icy-practice gap and it lacked the political partnerships that might have made this pos-
sible. At one SMS support group meeting in early 2002, the EC-TAER representative 
was specifically told by a OSCE delegate that they should not be involved in politics 
as that was the domain of the OSCE and OHR.143 However, in an environment and 
concerning an issue in which problems and politics cannot be separated, the effective-
ness of such an arrangement must be questioned. 
 
This arrangement led to a variety of problems. Recalcitrant entity ministry officials 
could not be compelled to work towards reform and therefore through their inaction or 
active obstruction could stall the process. Unproductive or poorly qualified working 
group members could not be removed or replaced, and potentially productive partici-
pants could not be selected and appointed to the working groups in their place. In the 
                                      
143 Personal observation by the author. 
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absence of an EC field-presence it was difficult for the SMS coordinators based in 
Sarajevo and Banja Luka to monitor the status of educational needs and reform at-
tempts in communities throughout BiH. While the OSCE initiated a field-office edu-
cation issue monitoring system in the months prior to its receipt of the education 
mandate, a more efficient field monitoring system should have been established from 
the beginning through the cultivation of working relationships and closer cooperation 
by EC-TAER with the OSCE field presence, SFOR civil-military units, or NGOs. 
 
As a result of the lack of formal relationships among the agencies, some specific and 
necessary efforts slipped through the cracks. For instance, the need for an information 
or public awareness campaign on the theme of education had been long acknowledged 
by EC-TAER, but there was no budget to support such a project. A team from OHR 
was initially established to develop it, based in part on the compilation and inventory 
of innovative education projects throughout the country. However, while this effort 
began in early 2001, it was never formally implemented and launched, and there was 
no education campaign until autumn 2002 when it was finally implemented by the 
OSCE. This would have been a simple effort that could have increased transparency 
of the process and raised public awareness of the reform activities, yet because it was 
not the stated responsibility of any organization it went unaddressed.  
 
Additionally, funding issues had an impact on the SMS initiative from the beginning 
of the effort as the initial budget allocated for the targeted CHB programme instead 
funded the much more substantial SMS. Promises to organize donor conferences to 
support educational reform were not fulfilled. Donations that were received came in 
piecemeal fashion and were designed for specific initiatives – funding for study tours, 
specific training initiatives, etc. - not to support overall coordination or reform in gen-
eral. EC-TAER staff eventually became aware of the EC decision to cut funding for 
all of its social cohesion projects, including SMS, in August 2001.144 This change 
occurred at approximately the same time that the EC announced that it would specifi-
cally focus its resources on those steps directly and specifically supporting BiH’s ef-
forts towards future EC membership. Although education would seem to be a basis 
                                      
144 This was a part of a policy change that shifted support from the PHARE programme to the CARDS 
funding structure. From 1998 to 2000 the EC funded education and health reform through its commit-
ment to support “social cohesion and development.” 
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for development strategies in all areas related to future EU membership, continued 
support to SMS did not fall under this support framework.  
 
In January 2002, the OSCE, which had been slowly becoming more involved in edu-
cation issues (and which had recently both transferred its election work to BiH au-
thorities and been overlooked for the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) fol-
low-on mission), suggested that if the EC did indeed cut EC-TAER funding, they 
would try to find a way to support the ongoing efforts. However, a surprise July 2002 
EC decision to provide follow-on funding in spite of previous statements led the 
OSCE to take the contingency funding out of their own budget. Therefore, when it 
emerged that the EC follow-on funding would be available exclusively for specific 
initiatives rather than the broad SMS effort, there were still lingering concerns about 
project prioritization and continuation. Continuity and planning were impossible in 
such an atmosphere. 
 
Some critics have noted that the SMS programme was weakened by failing to include 
sufficient local input. However, considering the amount of local input gathered 
throughout the process, this comment is difficult to justify. A case could be made that 
the input was not of the quality desired, but that is the risk that is run by letting a 
process unfold, of not being able to hand-select participants, and of having limited 
time to train facilitators and participants in the methods of participatory work. In addi-
tion, if local high-level politicians had continued to advocate BiH support, such an 
endorsement could have helped the pace of the reform process considerably. It has 
been noted that after the signing of the Jahorina Agreement, the Federation MOE de-
veloped its own reform strategy that was in many ways similar to the EC-TAER/SMS 
plan. However, the development of this plan was untimely as the SMS had already 
been signed by the Entities and work on the plan had already begun. Although the 
lower level working groups were serious and hardworking, this led to tensions be-
tween the Federation and EC-TAER and relationships were therefore often strained at 
the top levels.145 This incident must also be viewed in light of the fact that it has been 
unfortunately common in the divided political environment in BiH for parties to sign 
agreements and plans only to later introduce their own ideas, more in an effort to slow 
                                      
145 Personal interview, Jill Zarchin, UNICEF, Sarajevo, October 2002. 
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reform than to substantively improve the process. It also reflected the continuing in-
ternal tensions among Bosniak and Bosnian Croat representatives within the Federa-
tion as both entity level and cantonal level officials wanted to be involved at every 
stage of the process to ensure that the constitutionally-proscribed responsibility for 
education continued to be held by the cantons. 
 
Finally, it has been noted that the goals of the SMS team were good but too ambi-
tious.146  When the CHB was replaced by the SMS, the resources needed to imple-
ment such an expanded programme of activities did not match the new responsibili-
ties. Staff became responsible for planning, administration and implementation, as 
well as the obligatory diplomatic manoeuvring among BiH and IC politicians. The 
fact that SMS also lacked a support structure capable of managing the significant 
amount of information and the complex network of participants was particularly det-
rimental as the issue reached into every community.  
 
Any assessment of the SMS project to date must be formative rather than summative 
in nature, focusing on the processes involved in the first, preparatory stage of the pro-
posed multistage effort. It would be difficult to evaluate the developed set of recom-
mendations in the absence of any knowledge of how these suggestions will ultimately 
be implemented. The effectiveness of the first stage of the EC-TAER will best be 
measured as the proposed reforms are operationalized. However, understanding the 
organizational processes that drove the effort, the strengths and weaknesses of the 
project and the interagency relationships that contributed to the overall initiative, 
could help to advance inform the IC’s future cooperative efforts on primary and sec-
ondary educational reform. It could also provide lessons for interagency cooperation 
and local ownership processes for other reform efforts in regions in transition. 
 
D. Other Reform Activities 
A number of other educational reform and improvement initiatives were implemented 
before, or in parallel with the OHR and EC-TAER SMS efforts. The following sum-
marizes some highlights, but is not a thorough review of all activities. This review 
                                      
146 Personal interview, Jadranka Ruvić, European Commission Sarajevo Office, November 2002. 
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illustrates that while a formal mandate may have been lacking for educational reform, 
a wide variety of actors have contributed to reform activities at many different levels. 
 
1. Standards and Assessment Agency 
The World Bank has worked with EC-TAER on an effort to develop a state-level 
Standards and Assessment Agency (SAA). This Agency will define and measure 
standards and achievement throughout BiH to ensure the quality of both the teachers 
and the schools who deliver education, as well as of the students receiving an educa-
tion. Until recently, there has been no way to assess achievement and therefore no 
way to compare student achievement in BiH with students in other countries. This is 
imperative if BiH’s students are to be able to receive accredited diplomas, transferable 
to other universities and eventually enter into a wider European educational space 
through the Bologna Agreement.  
 
This reform need was initially recommended by the COE in 1999, and the SAA was 
formally established by the Entities on 10 March 2000. The project was funded by the 
Entities and the World Bank, with EC-TAER providing technical support and train-
ing. The project started slowly as SAA staff appointments were slow. Ultimately, two 
pilot tests were developed in mathematics and ‘mother tongue’ language and adminis-
tered to approximately 1500 students from 56 schools in May 2002. Results of the test 
were compiled in summer 2002, with a technical report reviewing the assessment pro-
cedure completed in the autumn. In general the pilot tests were well received. Stu-
dents believed they had sufficient time to complete the exam and were quickly able to 
overcome anticipated fears. While approximately 80 per cent of polled teachers agree 
that these tests are a good way of gathering information, 20 per cent (mainly elderly) 
viewed them as an “unnecessary burden” on the students and believed that they do not 
improve assessment quality.147 Key procedural challenges include the lack of an SAA 
presence outside of Sarajevo, the future logistics related to organizing much larger 
testing efforts involving more students and the fact that support among the Entities’ 
MOEs for an expanded programme of testing is not guaranteed. However, the devel-
                                      
147 Standards and Assessment Agency in Education for the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
Republika Srpska, “The External Assessment of Pupils’ Achievements: Technical Report”, October 
2002.  
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opment of testing and assessment is slated to continue through expanded pilot tests in 
2003.  
 
2. Vocational Education 
Both the EU and EC have supported reform in vocational education through the Voca-
tional Education and Training (VET) Programme and other efforts. The EC was in-
volved in vocational education reform as early as 1996, through the Obnova Voca-
tional Training Programme,148 which targeted demobilized soldiers, returnees, war-
widows and handicapped persons. The broader PHARE-funded 1997 VET pro-
gramme supported policy and strategy development, curricula development, teacher 
training and networking with European vocational schools and education and training 
measures for reintegration of refugees and other returnees.149 In Sarajevo in 1997, a 
specific vocational programme aimed at assisting demobilized soldiers was imple-
mented and successfully helped 30% of the soldiers who went through the programme 
to find jobs.150 Another EC vocational programme was started in 1999 and is slated to 
last through 2006. Working in 36 pilot schools in both entities, the EC is supporting a 
programme of occupation-specific curriculum development and technical training. A 
complementary programme, lasting from 2002 to 2004 will seek to address the educa-
tional needs of the labour market, involving small businesses, incorporating adult 
learning and encouraging continuing education.   
 
One of the primary goals of vocational education reform efforts is to reduce the num-
ber of specialty occupations (approximately 130). The goal is to develop “occupa-
tional families” or clusters, such as food processing, agriculture, electric power, etc., 
so that students leave training with a broader package of skills that they can utilize in 
many different types of jobs.151 A 2000 World Bank report noted that while the EU 
was significantly investing in and implementing a major programme on vocation edu-
cation, the programmes being developed are “far too occupationally-specific to meet 
the flexible labour needs of an emerging market economy.”152 Signs of progress are 
                                      
148 This effort had a budget of EUR 1.3m. 
149 This programme had a budget of EUR 3.4m. For more information, see The European Community 
(EC) Social Cohesion and Development Programme, at 
http://www.seerecon.org/Bosnia/Bosnia-DonorPrograms/Bosnia-Donors-EC/Sectors/social.htm. 
150 Personal interview, Jadranka Ruvić, European Commission Sarajevo Office, November 2002. 
151 Ibid. 
152 World Bank Project Appraisal Document for an Education Development Project, 19 April 2000. 
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visible, as new curricula have been developed for six occupations and implemented in 
30 schools.153 While the EC continues to organize workshops and meetings to ensure 
local participation in the development of vocational reforms, the World Bank and 
other organizations have not been satisfied with the pace of reform. In 2003 this re-
mains an issue that will necessitate cooperation between BiH officials reluctant to 
introduce changes to a long-standing system and reformers interested in strengthening 
this sector of education.  
 
3. University Education 
There have also been a range of initiatives to reform university education in BiH, in-
cluding programmes by EC-TAER, the COE, WUS Austria, the Phare Multi-Country 
Programme in Higher Education, SEED, CIVITAS and others. Beginning in 1996, the 
COE has worked with OHR and UNESCO to develop a Co-ordination Board for 
Higher Education (eventually known as the Higher Education Co-ordination Board, or 
HECB), which first met on 15 June 2000 and which continues to provide a forum for 
higher education discussions.154 A number of issues have been identified for reform 
including standardized quality assurance throughout BiH, reform of the legal structure 
of universities and faculties, reform of university funding legislation and practices, 
data collection and support for library resources and research.155 The issue of univer-
sity accreditation and recognition of BiH diplomas outside of BiH will be particularly 
important if university graduates are to be assured credentials that are valued through-
out Europe. Other more specific projects have addressed issues of distance learning 
and the development of specific technical curricula (such as accounting or business 
studies).  
 
Higher education reform has been slow and has not attracted the attention that pri-
mary/secondary reform has in the past year. There continues to be strong resistance to 
changes in the legal structures of the universities, as professors who have benefited 
financially from their significant autonomy and from the independent faculty ar-
rangement are loathe to lose these perks. To date, only the university in Tuzla has 
                                      
153 OSCE Mission to BiH, Education Reform Agenda: An Update, June 2002, 3. 
154  Hugh Glanville, “Towards an IC Strategy in Support of Higher Education in BiH”, unpublished 
paper, EC-TAER, January 2002. 
155 Ibid. 
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made substantive reform in its university. However, the crucial role that higher educa-
tion plays in economic development and reducing the impact of ‘brain drain’ should 
ensure that the focus on higher education reform by the BiH and IC authorities inten-
sifies. 
 
4.  Structural Reform Initiatives 
The COE has assisted in the development of action plans to address structural reform 
(including legislative reform), curricula, standards, teaching methods and regional 
cooperation with a focus on policy development rather than technical assistance.156 
COE initiatives tend to be broad and high-level, with a regional focus seeking general 
agreement and adherence to European norms rather than implementing specific solu-
tions in the field. The COE worked with local authorities to draft educational legisla-
tion, including the State Framework Law on Primary and Secondary Education that 
was adopted by the Parliament in June 2003 and the Law on Higher Education re-
leased for public review in May 2003. The COE has also provided support for the 
development and adoption of European history textbooks. In addition to these COE 
efforts, UNESCO and the UNDP, with World Bank support, have cooperated on an 
effort to develop an Education Management Information System to collect and ana-
lyze data pertaining to education in BiH more systematically. Together, these reforms 
are building the necessary educational ‘infrastructure’ necessary for any modern edu-
cation system. 
 
 
5. Teacher Training 
UNICEF has focused on providing technical and practical support to pre-primary, 
primary and secondary schools, including teacher training and the development of 
“Child Friendly Schools”. Their projects, while not specifically driven by a peace-
oriented curriculum, seek to mainstream respect for diversity, tolerance and critical 
thinking into the overall curriculum in order to help students develop these skills. In 
contrast to the teacher-focused instruction strategies traditionally used in the average 
                                      
156 A “Framework Programme of Co-operation” for 2002-2004, and an “Action Plan of Activities” for 
July-December 2002 were agreed upon between the Council of Europe Secretariat (Directorate of 
School, Out-of-School and Higher Education) and the Entity Ministers of Education of BiH in July 
2002. 
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BiH classroom, UNICEF’s training workshops instruct teachers about the benefits of 
a democratic classroom in which children experience an interactive learning environ-
ment that encourages independent analysis and creativity. UNICEF is also supporting 
a programme called “Foundations for Democracy”, a three-year, $1.3 million pro-
gramme similar to the Child Friendly Schools effort which will continue to support 
classroom reform through child-centred teacher training and introducing more modern 
pedagogical approaches.157  Additionally, the Teacher Education and Professional 
Development Program (TEPD), a cooperative programme between the governments 
of Finland and BiH, has provided specific training on inclusive education and pub-
lished an anthology of inclusive education theory and best practices in May 2003.158 
 
6. NGO Initiatives 
Several non-governmental initiatives have also made contributions to the reform ef-
fort. 
In cooperation with the Cantonal MOE, the Open Society Fund (OSF) in BiH sup-
ported an educational reform project in 14 schools in the Tuzla Canton entitled 
“Model for System Change in Secondary Education”. In March 2001 OSF BiH signed 
Letters of Agreement with the 14 schools to ensure formal commitment to participa-
tion in the three-year project. The goals of this model network include the introduc-
tion of continual in-service teacher training, increased community involvement 
through parent and student associations and democratization of the teaching and learn-
ing process. OSF support touches on several different aspects of education including: 
school organization and management, teacher training, curriculum, textbooks materi-
als, non-formal learning/community and youth activities and canton education policy 
development.  
 
The Education for Peace (EFP) Institute of the Balkans has been involved in educa-
tion reform through its emphasis on peace-focused conflict resolution and diversity 
promotion programmes.159 The EFP model integrates the tenets of peace education 
                                      
157 Since 2002, more than 1200 teachers have attended child-centred teaching training workshops or-
ganized jointly by UNICEF, the Open Society Foundation and the Centre for Education Initiatives 
‘Step by Step’. OSCE Statement, Coalition Press Information Centre Press Conference, Sarajevo, 26 
August 2003. 
158 See http://www.hcg.helsinki.fi/projects for more information on the TEPD programme. 
159 See the Education for Peace Year I Report and http://www.landegg.edu for more information.  
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throughout the curriculum to aid in trauma recovery and development of a culture of 
tolerance, peace and healing. Beginning in 2000, EFP launched a pilot programme, 
working in six schools in BiH.160 Their inclusive and broad approach integrates teach-
ers, educational support staff, parents, children and the community at large, and EFP 
estimates they have involved 18,000 people in their work.161 In addition to working 
with these specific schools, EFP started to develop a curriculum reflective of intereth-
nic life and understanding, which promotes civic responsibility and awareness through 
community service. The EFP programme is expanding, with plans to integrate the 
approach into 100 schools and introduce a professional teacher certification pro-
gramme. EFP will also begin working with ‘special situation schools’ in need of in-
tensive help and support, beginning with two schools in Mostar.162 The organisation’s 
presence in Sarajevo will become a Regional Centre for other initiatives in the Bal-
kans, allowing the programme to become one in which BiH can offer examples of 
best practices and training resources. EFP has communicated with OHR, EC-TAER 
and the BiH ministries since the beginning of its efforts to ensure broad awareness 
and understanding of their approach to reform. Their initiatives have been widely 
praised.  
 
BiH NGOs involved in reform include Education Builds BiH, Be My Friend and 
Duga, among others. These groups tend to have a specific focus, such as scholarship 
aid to students in need, or provision of special education to support students with spe-
cial needs or the socially marginalized (particularly the Roma). These efforts are good 
examples of how community organizations can complement a public social service, 
which can only strengthen education in BiH in the long-term. 
 
E. The Case of Brčko  
Brčko District, as an autonomous district that exists apart from the legal structures of 
the two entities, is always an exception to politics as usual in BiH. The district has 
been run more or less as a protectorate under the Brčko District Supervisor, who has 
                                      
160 In Travnik, Sarajevo and Banja Luka. 
161 See http://www.landegg.edu. 
162 Funding for these initiatives has been provided by the Swiss Rotary Club and the Japanese Embassy 
in BiH. 
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the authority to impose laws and remove obstructionists.163 While the High Represen-
tative has the power to impose laws deemed necessary to ensure Dayton implementa-
tion, the Brčko Supervisor has been able to do so more freely as he does not have to 
negotiate compromises with the two entities and operates in a district that has been 
locally governed by a transitional administration rather than elected officials. This 
unique arrangement, together with intense international involvement and funding, has 
enabled it to move from the ‘make or break’ issue that it was at the Dayton negotia-
tions to a system often pointed to as a model for reform in the entities. However, its 
unique status in BiH also makes it a very specific case that may hold limited applica-
ble best practices for the rest of the country. In the case of educational reform, at least 
one observer has suggested using the term “Brčko experience” rather than “Brčko 
model”, due to its unique approach and circumstances that may not be duplicable 
throughout BiH. 
 
Brčko was the site of terrible violence during the war as its position in the northeast 
corner of BiH places it in a strategic location, connecting the two parts of the RS, bor-
dering Serbia on the east and Croatia on the north. Before reform efforts began, 
schools in Brčko were segregated according to ethnicity, with children of different 
ethnic groups attending school during different shifts. Post-war intransigence in Brčko 
created a climate inhospitable to refugee return. On 14 February 1997 the Brčko Arbi-
tration Tribunal164 mandated the establishment of a Special Representative of the 
OHR, the Brčko Supervisor, to supervise implementation of the DPA in the region. 
The 15 March 1999 arbitration decision to establish Brčko as a District independent 
from both entities - a compromise solution that was accepted relatively peacefully 
despite claims from both Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks that it would lead to mass pro-
tests - solidified the unique position of Brčko within BiH. 
 
 After the Brčko arbitration decision, the pace of reform accelerated in all areas of 
life: demilitarization, economic development and education. The Brčko Supervisor 
                                      
163 There have been three Supervisors (all from the United States): Robert Farrand, who served from 
1997 to May 2000, Gary Matthews (June 2000-March 2001), and Henry Clarke, who began in April 
2001 and continues in this capacity. Gerhard Sondheim served as Acting Supervisor from March to 
April 2001. 
164 The status of Brčko as a part of either the FBiH or the RS could not be decided at Dayton and an 
arbitration solution was agreed upon to determine its final status at a later date. 
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established an Education Department within his office in July 1999, and an Annex to 
the Final Award (18 August 18 1999) confirmed the intent to integrate the education 
system: “According to that Annex to the Decision, the Supervisor shall carry out the 
integration of the education system of the District, harmonize curricula and ensure the 
removal of teaching material which he finds not to be consistent to the goals of (the) 
creation of a multiethnic societies of the District.”165 This provided the Supervisor 
with a clear mandate for reform. 
 
The need for reform became very clear in the riots of October 2000 as over 1,000 
Bosnian Serb students (widely assumed to have been incited by nationalist Serb agita-
tors) protested and demanded separate schools, rather than the already segregated 
morning/afternoon shift system in place. Bosniak students were injured in the melee 
and demanded better protection from the local and international authorities working to 
mediate the situation. This was not a riot based simply on educational issues; rather 
this incident reflected the opposition among hardliners to integration in the district 
and the animosity that lingered after the decision to make Brčko a special autonomous 
district. 
 
Until reform began, in addition to three different curricula, RS law, the Tuzla canton 
law and the Posavina canton law were all in use in Brčko district, thus creating a very 
complex system. Educational reform in Brčko was guided by several laws including 
the 10 May 2000 agreement signed by the Ministers of Education. On 13 February 
2001 the Brčko Supervisor mandated the development of the Education Collegium as 
a coordinating body for secondary education and the Board for the Quality of Primary 
Education. The education law was drafted by the Brčko Law Review Commission and 
approximately 25 public forums on the issue were held to raise awareness of the is-
sue.166 When the District government failed to pass a new, unitary law with an em-
phasis on desegregation, Supervisor Clarke imposed a single Law on Education and a 
harmonized curriculum on 5 July 2001.  
 
                                      
165 Government of the Brčko District, Summary Review (English version), “Key Elements of the Edu-
cation Model in the Brčko  District of BiH”, 24 December 2001.  
 
166 The author would like to thank Ken Palmer for his insight on this issue. 
 
 
79
The new curriculum was implemented at the start of the 2001 school year and consid-
ering the concerns lingering after the October 2000 riots, was implemented peace-
fully. In the autumn of 2002, “the international administration in Brčko consolidated 
four Bosniak schools, three Serb schools, and one Croat school into four premises.” 
While the former ‘school’ class remained segregated within the newly organized 
premises, the first-year students were integrated, with plans to similarly integrate the 
new class each autumn. Through this incremental approach, “by 2005, all of the 
schools will be integrated.”167 The Supervisor worked through the education depart-
ment, cooperating with local professionals and authorities, IOs and NGOs to imple-
ment this change. Civitas and the COE were involved in the curriculum harmonization 
and other reform processes and EC-TAER provided technical support with the aware-
ness campaign and workshops for the local coordinating board assigned to implement 
these reforms. An information campaign was developed and implemented to ensure 
transparency regarding the reforms to generate public understanding and acceptance. 
 
The unitary law took great care to ensure that national identity issues such as language 
were protected for all residents of Brčko. Four general principles of the law are 
applicable to all grade levels: 
1. Freedom of pupils to express themselves in their own language 
2. Issuance of school documents in the language and alphabet as requested by a pupil 
3. Appropriate ethnic composition of teachers for the instruction of national group 
subjects 
4. Use of existing textbooks in line with the harmonized curriculum.  
 
Additional, more specific requirements were also addressed: 
· From third grade the equal use of both alphabets is guaranteed through a system of 
weekly rotation 
· Language and cultural instruction will be carried out in separate classes  
· The instruction of ‘non-national subjects’, such as mathematics, science, physical 
education and art are to be carried out in joint classes.168 
                                      
167 Viola Gienger, “Bosnia’s Learning Curves”, Transitions Online, July 2002 at http://www.tol.cz. 
168 “Key Elements of the education model in the Brčko District of BiH”, Government of the Brčko 
District, 24 December 2001. 
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In practice, the result of these laws and guidelines is that children spend the majority 
of their time together in mixed classes. Observers point out that while some politi-
cians continue to complain in an attempt to gain political capital, the children are 
happy to go to school together. Additionally, the lack of riots, protests or violence 
illustrates that Brčko’s system of carefully mandated inclusiveness works. Individual 
objections or problems have been resolved through contacts and communication be-
tween students, parents, teachers and administrators. 
 
The “Brčko experience” while an appropriate solution to the special status and situa-
tion of the District, may, by its very uniqueness, be limited in its potential applicabil-
ity as a state-wide model. First, the Brčko Supervisor’s powers have in many ways 
made the district an internal protectorate; an American ‘fiefdom’ that has managed its 
affairs in a very different environment than that of the rest of the country. It bears re-
peating that the law paving the way for these reforms was imposed by the Brčko Su-
pervisor, not adopted by reform-minded politicians.  
 
Second, several experts note that success to date has been a result of a high concentra-
tion of IC money, effort, attention and technical assistance, which would be impossi-
ble to duplicate throughout the entire territory of BiH. When the law was imposed by 
the IC, all teachers in the district were fired, and a selection of teachers rehired under 
new contracts and at a salary much higher than average in BiH. While there has been 
praise for the teachers involved as they have been professional, enthusiastic and ready 
and willing to work together, these higher salaries have served as an incentive and 
discouraged potential protest or obstruction.  
 
Third, while some have encouraged the entities to consider using the Brčko curricu-
lum, others will point out that the Brčko curricula does not go far enough in integrat-
ing students as classes in the national subjects are not held together. Similarly, while 
the basic curricular reforms in Brčko were imposed and implemented sooner than re-
form in the rest of BiH, its reform process is not over. It is recognized that integration 
was a necessary first step and that general modernization is needed to make the educa-
tional system more effective. Despite Brčko’s special status, teachers and educators 
from Brčko have participated in the SMS programme and the Brčko District govern-
 
 
81
ment will be included in future general modernization and reform efforts. Therefore, 
while progress to date cannot be minimized, the status quo in Brčko should be viewed 
as the floor and not the ceiling, as there is still room for improvement and reform. 
 
In summary, educational reform in Brčko cannot be considered in isolation from other 
reforms in the district or its unique status as an autonomous district within BiH. How-
ever, while these circumstances may limit applicability of some best practices in the 
rest of BiH, it does demonstrate the political circumstances that can facilitate reform, 
the potential for change when hardliners or obstructionists are marginalized from the 
process and the willingness of average citizens – particularly students, parents and 
teachers – to work and study together when given the chance.169 
 
F. The OSCE’s Reform Effort 
1. The Mandate 
At first glance, the OSCE was not a natural or obvious candidate to receive the man-
date to lead educational reform in BiH. Prior to 2002, despite its general mandate to 
support human rights, the Mission in BiH was not interested in education as evi-
denced by its lack of participation in other ongoing efforts, its absence at the May 
2001 SMS project launch and its lack of education support activities.170 The OSCE 
Mission in BiH (MBiH) had started to support EC-TAER’s SMS efforts by paying for 
workshop participant transport, a minimal step that put the issue of education on the 
radar screens of a few members of the human rights staff. The first direct participation 
of the OSCE in the SMS effort began at the workshop in February 2002, when OSCE 
staff participated in the development of the post-workshop report. The Organization 
played a crucial role in developing and pushing the parties to adopt the Interim 
Agreement on Accommodation of Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children in 
March 2002, demonstrating its increasing interest in the subject, as well as its existing 
mandate in human rights. 
 
                                      
169 In the OSCE Permanent Council discussion concerning the MBiH’s assumption of the education 
mandate, the US delegation stated that “the Brčko school district’s recent integration was deemed a 
very positive example.” OSCE Permanent Council Notes, July 2002. 
170 Educational issues were addressed through work on Roma empowerment and capacity building, but 
within the framework of Roma inclusion, not educational reform. 
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Still, within the greater OSCE structure there was no deep experience in educational 
reform. Training efforts in the area of democratization and electoral reform had been 
instituted in several countries, but these were simple skills and capacity-building ex-
ercises rather than educational reform efforts. The OSCE Secretariat in Vienna had no 
expert or staff dedicated to the issue and the democratization arm of the OSCE, the 
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), focused on election 
and democratization awareness and training. There was discussion within the OSCE 
Permanent Council in Vienna regarding this new and significant responsibility, with 
participating states generally welcoming the opportunity to participate in this area of 
reform. 
 
The OSCE mandate for education must also be considered in light of the general 
streamlining and reorganization of the IC in BiH as the OHR shifted responsibilities, 
such as human rights and military stabilization, over to the OSCE and the UN MIBH 
made plans to close down its operation. The OSCE, which has built much of its mis-
sion and field structure in BiH on its Annex 3 election mandate, had transferred elec-
tion authority over to local authorities in 2002, considerably trimming down its re-
sponsibilities while maintaining its field presence. There had been speculation that the 
OSCE might assume the mandate for the UN IPTF follow-on police mission, but the 
EU in 2002 received the mandate and likely needed to make choices in other potential 
reform activities. While the EC, with its experience in education reform in BiH, may 
have seemed a natural candidate for the mandate, it has been noted that the EC im-
plements projects, rather than approaches reform from a political/policy oriented point 
of view. It would not therefore be able to play the crucial, necessary role in policy 
reform. Therefore, the OSCE, with its experience and infrastructure in BiH, comple-
tion of its election mandate and strong field-presence became the candidate of choice 
in 2002. 
 
2. Implementation Strategy 
The OSCE formally received the mandate to facilitate and coordinate the educational 
reform effort on 4 July 2002, though there had been speculation that they would take 
on this responsibility several months prior to this date. An Education Department was 
established within the mission HQ, regional education coordinators were established 
in Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla and Banja Luka, and educational contact points were as-
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signed in regional and field offices. A field office reporting structure was created in 
early 2002 to ensure information flow on educational developments from the field. 
 
A “Consultation Paper” was released in July 2002 to describe the proposed structure 
of the education reform effort.171 The paper proposed the adoption of an approach 
organized according to the Task Force structure that was introduced by the OHR to 
coordinate efforts that necessitate interagency cooperation.172 On 21 November a 
strategy paper entitled “Reforming Education to Give BiH a Better Future” was deliv-
ered to the PIC, explaining the objectives of the education reform effort including 
actions, pledges and timeframes.173 
 
The Education Issue Set Steering Group (EISSG) was established within the Institu-
tion Building Task Force, consisting of agency heads from the OSCE, OHR, UNI-
CEF, UNESCO, UNHCR, COE, EC, World Bank and others as appropriate or neces-
sary. Six working groups were proposed with relevant chairs and actors identified: 
· Education Access and Non-Discrimination (OSCE/UNHCR) 
· Quality and Modernization of Primary and General Secondary Education (UNI-
CEF, UNESCO, EC TAER) 
· Quality and Modernization of Vocational Education (EC/EU VET) 
· Quality and Modernization of Higher Education (EC TAER) 
· Education Financing and Management (World Bank/OSCE) 
· Reform of Education Legislation (COE/OSCE) 
These steering groups share many similarities with the SMS Working Groups. In fact, 
the OSCE noted its interest in adopting and building on work that had already been 
done through EC-TAER’s effort. A comparison of the SMS working group partici-
pants as noted in the First Report to the Ministers of Education in BiH and the 
OSCE’s education working group and reference group contact list reveals a mix of old 
and new names. For example, while only one representative of working group 4.3 was 
                                      
171 Consultation Paper 1 - Proposed Consultation and Co-ordination Structures for Stakeholders In-
volved in Education Reform, July 2002. This document was developed by the OSCE Mission to BiH. 
172 The Return and Reconstruction Task Force (RRTF) has been identified as a good example of the 
success of the task force approach. In the restructuring exercises of 2001 and 2002, additional task 
forces were set up for rule of law, institution building and economic development.  
173 “OSCE Applauds Education Strategy Presentation”, OSCE Press Release, 21 November 2002. 
While developed substantially by the OSCE, the paper was presented to the PIC by relevant BiH au-
thorities. 
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transitioned into the Access and Non-Discrimination Working Group, four of the six 
members of the SMS working group on Elaboration of a Framework for a General 
Education Law continued to participate in either the working group or reference group 
on legislation. 
 
The working groups are the main driver for reform and are supported by larger Refer-
ence Groups that are not closely involved in the project drafting process, but can pro-
vide additional input and recommendations. A series of large “education forums” 
have been organized to provide an opportunity for all interested stakeholders, observ-
ers and the media to come together to discuss the process and progress to date.  
 
3. Returnee and Minority Access 
The fact that the OSCE is placing a greater emphasis on issues of returnee and minor-
ity access through its Education Access and Non-discrimination Working Group and 
associated Reference Group demonstrates a clear change in approach. This group has 
a specific focus on Roma and national minorities and a higher profile than the re-
turnee inclusion working group (4.3) in the SMS, where returnee issues were bundled 
with special needs education. This prioritization reflects both the OSCE’s work on 
human rights and Roma capacity-building initiatives, as well as its possession of a 
solid mandate for reform and the political weight such a mandate carries in terms of 
its ability to push the parties towards reform on difficult issues such as returnee inte-
gration.   
 
The OSCE had been instrumental in developing the 5 March 2002 Interim Agreement 
on the Accommodation of Specific Needs and Rights of Returnee Children174 and 
aims to both implement this interim agreement and seek long-term solutions to ensure 
education access in a non-discriminatory environment. The most important element of 
the agreement stipulates that children will be taught all general subjects on the basis 
of the local curriculum in use in a given community, but may choose to follow the 
curriculum they prefer for the national group of subjects. For example, a Bosnian 
Croat family returning to a Bosnian Serb majority area could choose to have their 
                                      
174 Signed by the Entity Ministers of Education and the Cantonal Ministries of Education, Science Cul-
ture and Sport. 
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children receive courses for literature, history and religion from the Bosnian Croat 
curricula.  
 
As a part of the implementation of this agreement, there is also a strategy to more 
broadly address the issue of the ‘national group’ of subjects. Draft implementation 
plans call for these subjects to be taught according to standards provided in the offi-
cial curriculum. In schools in which 18 or more students in a grade request that na-
tional subjects be taught according to a different accepted curricula than the primary 
one in use at that school, the schools will be required to organize additional classes. If 
fewer than 18 students request an alternate curriculum for the national subjects, the 
school must organize extra-curricular classes.175 The implementation plan for this 
agreement also emphasizes the need to hire returnee teachers to ensure a diverse 
teaching staff, ethnically diverse school boards reflective of a community and a for-
mal and systematic monitoring system to ensure implementation at the local level.  
 
The first meeting of the Co-ordination Board for the implementation of this agreement 
was held on 21 January.176 The Board supported the proposal to reestablish the Text-
book Commission to ensure that books teaching the national subjects are not objec-
tionable, and the entity and cantonal MOEs signed an MOU to reestablish the Com-
mission on 5 March 2003, with the goal of removing all inappropriate content from 
textbooks by the next school year.177 The OSCE is also taking steps to ensure that 
schools do not display offensive or exclusive symbols and do not have names that 
could be offensive to any group, particularly returnees.  
 
In May 2003, the OSCE published statistics on the implementation of the Interim 
Agreement to date, measuring the percentage of returnee students and teachers in each 
of the cantons in the Federation and in the RS. In terms of returnee students, Central 
                                      
175 Implementation Plan for the Interim Agreement on Accommodation of Specific Needs and Rights of 
Returnee Children, draft, November 2002. This document was developed by the OSCE Mission to 
BiH.  
176 The Board is co-chaired by Mustafa Demir, Assistant Minister of the Federation Ministry for Educa-
tion, Science, Culture and Sport, and Ranko Savanović, Assistant Minister of the Ministry of Education 
in the RS. 
177 “Important Step towards Implementing Agreement on Education of Returnee Children”, OSCE 
Press Release, 22 January 2003, and “Ministers Sign MoU Re-establishing Textbook Review Commis-
sion”, OSCE Press Release, 5 March 2003. 
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Bosnia canton and Sarajevo canton lead (17.21% and 13.63%, respectively), while 
Posavina canton, Zenica-Doboj canton and West Herzegovina canton demonstrate the 
lowest percentage of returnee students (0.47%, 0.04% and 0.44% respectively). In the 
RS, 3.21% of students are returnees. In terms of returnee teachers, Central Bosnia 
canton and Sarajevo canton lead in the Federation (15.08% and 14.52%), while 
Posavina and Zenica-Doboj cantons have zero returnee teachers. The RS has 1.41% of 
returnee teachers among its educators.178 There is clearly much progress to be made, 
but the compilation of such data for the first time is an important first step in identify-
ing problems areas. 
 
In addition to ensuring the rights of returnee children, the Education Access and Non-
discrimination working group is addressing more general access issues among na-
tional minorities with the goal of ensuring “that all children who are members of na-
tional minorities (particularly Romani children) are appropriately included in the edu-
cation system throughout the country.” The OSCE proposes that this be done by hav-
ing the national minorities define their own needs and establish an implementation 
plan. The OSCE also acknowledges that it will be important for BiH’s non-Roma na-
tional minorities (not as socially marginalized as the Roma, but due to their small 
numbers often forgotten) to become engaged in the reform process. While access is-
sues are key, inclusion of all national minorities in the curriculum is also important to 
ensure compliance with European norms regarding minority rights, as well as to en-
sure that their contributions to BiH’s culture and society are not forgotten.179 
 
4. Information Campaign 
After years of acknowledging the need for, and benefits of an educational public 
awareness effort, the OSCE launched an education campaign on 28 October 2002 to 
highlight model schools and best practices and to encourage open discussion on the 
                                      
178 “Preliminary Statistics on the Implementation of the Interim Agreement on the Accommodation of 
Special Needs and Rights of Returnee Children”, Co-ordination Board for the Implementation of the 
March 5 2002 Interim Agreement on Returnee Children, 19 May 2003, at http://www.oscebih.org for 
report. 
179 ECMI sponsored a workshop on the topic of national minorities and educational reform in BiH on 
22 November 2002 in Sarajevo. Representatives of Albanian, Czech, Hungarian, Macedonian, Slove-
nian, Jewish, Ukrainian and Roma associations attended this first seminar on the topic. The workshop 
report is available on the ECMI web site, http://www.ecmi.de. 
 
 
87
reform process.180 The launch was inaugurated at six schools that have “set a good 
example, introducing innovative techniques and promoting inclusive education.”181 
As a part of the information campaign, an extensive ‘education dictionary’ was pub-
lished in mid-March, which includes information about schools using modern tech-
niques and approaches to illustrate best practices and encourage similar reform by 
others. Competitions and contests to invite school children to propose reform activi-
ties have added to the visibility of the effort.182 The campaign was planned to continue 
through the end of the 2002 to 2003 school year and has been supplemented by a 
“This Year to School Together” campaign that marked the beginning of the 2003 to 
2004 school year.  
 
5. Preliminary Assessment 
The goals of the OSCE-facilitated initiative are ambitious and fall within an aggres-
sive timeline. As the 2003 to 2004 school year begins, work is proceeding in each of 
the working groups and there are initial signs of progress. The first meeting of the 
Common Core Curriculum Steering Board and Working Groups was held in Banja 
Luka on 8 May and the goal of adopting a country-wide core curriculum before the 
new school year was accomplished.183 The common core curriculum adopted on 8 
August provides a framework that will be incorporated into the entity and cantonal 
curricula. This core harmonized framework will make it easier for students and teach-
ers to transfer schools throughout BiH, and will ensure that students to spend more 
time together in general non-national subject courses. While a step forward, there is 
still much work to be done, as this framework is “based on the common elements of 
the existing curricula”, and therefore does not include the ‘national subjects’.184 Addi-
tionally, teachers in any country would recognize the challenges of creating lesson 
                                      
180 OHR had planned to initiate a public awareness campaign to help gain support for the education 
reform effort. However, after the OSCE received the education mandate the campaign was delayed 
until after the elections. While some could argue that ensuring that education was an issue discussed in 
the November 2002 elections would be an idea worth promoting, in the political climate in BiH there 
was more concern that it would be used as a nationalist rallying card to protect national interests.  
181 “Promoting Experience and Vision for Education Reform in BiH”, OSCE Press Release, 28 October 
2002. 
182 See “OSCE Praises Students for their Plans to Reform Education”, OSCE Press Release, 23 April 
2003. 
183 A goal reiterated at the 8 April Education Forum. See “Education Forum Supports Implementation 
Priorities”, OSCE Press Release, 8 April 2003. 
184 “Education Ministers Adopt Common Core Curriculum for September School Start”, OSCE Press 
Release, 8 August 2003. 
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plans based on a new curriculum in such a short preparatory time frame, and the 
teachers of BiH will ultimately bear much of the burden of responding to changing 
requirements.  
 
The Textbook Commission agreed on the revision of national subject textbooks in 
July. Agreement was reached on removing offensive materials and terminology and 
maps were revised to reflect BiH’s existence as a state. Rather than beginning the dif-
ficult task of providing accounts of the history of the region over the past ten years, 
events will be listed in simple chronological order.185 This reflects the realisation that 
the writing and teaching of history will continue to be a major challenge, and the pref-
erence for an incremental approach to this aspect of reform. In addition to these sub-
stantive content issues, there is continuing controversy over the printing of new text-
books that could delay the delivery of texts, as BiH must implement cost-effective 
reform while reducing dependence on outside publishers and supporting its own pub-
lishing industry.  
 
There has also been progress made in the development of relevant legislation, though 
all people involved in the reform are aware of the limits of legislation in the absence 
of serious implementation. In spite of initial concerns about the nationalist govern-
ments established after the October 2002 elections, there is cautious optimism that the 
experts involved in the process will be able to propose technically-appropriate, non-
political recommendations for reform implementation.186 While the Framework Law 
on Primary and Secondary Education was adopted in June, additional legislative de-
velopment will be needed to ensure that the tenets of the law are integrated into the 
entity and canton level laws, resulting in harmonized legislation state-wide.187 It is 
expected that these laws will be adopted by the end of this calendar year. On 13 May 
a ‘green paper’ developed by BiH education experts with EC-TAER support was pre-
                                      
185 Julie Geshakova, “Officials Taking Steps to End Ethnic Divisions”, Radio Free Europe/Radio Lib-
erty, 29 August 2003. 
186 It should be noted that following the establishment of the new BiH Council of Ministers, education 
was moved from the portfolio of the Ministry for Human Rights and Refugees to the Ministry for Civil 
Affairs. The potential impact of this reorganization will likely become clear in the 2003-2004 school 
year. 
187 Highlights of the draft law include a single system of accreditation, certificates and diplomas to ease 
mobility of students throughout BiH, a common core curriculum and an article that makes religious 
classes optional and ungraded. See Daniela Valenta, “Educating Bosnia”, Institute for War and Peace 
Reporting (IWPR) Balkan Crisis Report, 2 May 2003. 
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sented which includes recommendations for primary and secondary reform, including 
the development of a framework curriculum and the elimination of the practice of 
requiring extra exams for students changing school and residence.188 In addition to the 
development of a draft Law on Higher Education, on 25 April the entity Education 
Ministers signed a joint letter to the Greek EU Presidency to affirm their commitment 
to, and to outline steps towards signing the Bologna Declaration.189 A law on higher 
education has not yet been passed, but this is in part reflective of the slower pace of 
reform in the field of higher education in general. The impact of these legal reforms 
will begin to be felt as implementation proceeds in the 2003 to 2004 school year. 
 
There have been practical and tangible signs of progress, that while not necessarily 
representative of the state of reform throughout the country, provide interesting snap-
shots of reform. On the first day of the 2003 to 2004 school year eight Bosniak stu-
dents began their schooling in Višegrad for the first time in 11 years. The municipal 
authorities in Višegrad have committed to ensuring funds for transportation and text-
books for the children, and the first returnee teacher has started to work in the school 
system.190 Efforts have begun to more widely advertise teacher vacancies, to ensure 
that returnee teachers are aware of these opportunities and welcomed to apply. Addi-
tionally, as a part of the broader IC effort to integrate structures in Mostar, Mostar 
schools are being specially targeted for modernisation and integration. 
 
Similarly, many challenges remain. On 25 August High Representative Paddy Ash-
down fined the ruling nationalist Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) political party 
20,000 Euro for their failure to issue instructions on the administrative unification of 
the “two schools under one roof” in the Srednja-Bosna and Herzegovina-Neretva can-
tons. While the IC views this inaction as an act of obstruction, the politicians in these 
cantons claim concern over the protection of the Croatian language in unified 
schools.191 The integration of schools in the municipality of Žepće continues to be 
                                      
188 A follow-on ‘white paper’ is intended to be completed in October 2003. 
189 “OSCE, OHR and COE Welcome Important Steps towards Signing of Bologna Declaration by 
BiH”, OSCE Press Release, 25 April 2003. 
190 “Bosniak Pupils in Schools in Višegrad”, Dnevni List, 1 September 2003, 5. 
191 Anes Alić, “Bosnia: Doing Away with Segregation – Ashdown Hits Leading Bosnian Croat Party 
with a Heavy Fine for Obstructing Education Reform”, Transitions Online, 1 September 2003, at 
www.tol.cz.  
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problematic.192 Teachers waiting for payment of salaries from the previous school 
year have gone on strike to demand payment.193 More generally, problems similar to 
those found in any cash-strapped school system will necessitate difficult choices and 
actions. OSCE officials estimate that 90 per cent of education funds in BiH are spent 
on personnel costs alone, leaving little for upkeep of schools, purchase of supplies or 
even basic needs such as electricity. On the micro- and macro levels, reform will ne-
cessitate painful and controversial choices in the short-term, if reform is to be success-
ful in the long-term. 
 
It is too early to provide a summative/results-oriented evaluation of the OSCE’s pro-
gress. The 2003 to 2004 school year will be crucial, as goals outlined in the OSCE 
implementation plans are operationalized and legislation and harmonized curricula are 
drafted, adopted and integrated into schools throughout BiH. A preliminary formative, 
process-oriented evaluation of the OSCE’s approach to education reform to date re-
veals a strong start-up effort bolstered by its mandate, a high profile information cam-
paign and a visible commitment to reform. Whether this considerable activity trans-
lates into real accomplishment remains to be seen. Additionally, it must be empha-
sised that while the OSCE has the mandate and means to serve as the primary coordi-
nator of the effort, it lacks the funds to implement specific technical assistance pro-
jects itself, and is therefore dependent on the various implementing agencies involved 
as partners in reform. The dynamics and ultimate effect of this approach, separating 
coordination and implementation roles, should be closely assessed in the future, as it 
could provide interesting organisational development lessons to be learned. 
 
However, the speed with which the OSCE has moved forward the reform initiative 
reflects both the culmination of previous reform efforts that provided a foundation for 
further reform work and the OSCE’s own organizational evolution and maturity after 
seven plus years in BiH. Additionally, the role of individual personalities cannot be 
underestimated in this effort. OSCE MBiH Head of Mission, Ambassador Robert 
                                      
192 On the first day of school there were some attempts to prevent approximately 300 Bosnian Croat 
children  from attending school in Maglaj. There have been ongoing political disagreements on the 
issue of  integrated schooling in this area. See “OHR and OSCE Mission Condemn Efforts to Prevent 
Children from Attending School in Maglaj”, OSCE Press Release, 2 September 2003.  “Head of OSCE 
Mission Concerned with Ethnic Segregation of Students in Žepće”, OSCE Press Release, 30 August 
2003. 
193 The strike occurred in the Herzegovina-Neretva canton, in primary and secondary schools. 
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Beecroft, not only received the mandate to push ahead with reform, but has the per-
sonal interest and experience as a former schoolteacher to drive the issue.194 As an 
American representative, it is likely that his access to key contemporary players such 
as US Ambassador Clifford Bond and PDHR Hays has facilitated the diplomatic 
process and created an atmosphere in which both political and practical reforms are 
more achievable. The efforts of the OSCE, together with other key actors such as the 
World Bank and the EC will be worthy of further observation and study as reforms on 
paper are turned into changes in the schools themselves. 
                                      
194 Ambassador Beecroft began serving as OSCE MBiH Head of Mission in July 2001. 
 
 
92
VI. Lessons Learned – For BiH and Elsewhere 
There are a number of lessons to be learned from BiH’s educational reform odyssey. 
First, basic necessary changes in the educational system have often been stymied by 
politically charged issues such as curriculum reform and history textbooks. The atten-
tion to these and other controversial themes such as school segregation, while raising 
the issues to the level of discussion, has paradoxically minimized room for manoeuvre 
and reform as identity-focused issues have been seized upon by authorities interested 
in continued division. This has been recognized for some time, as a World Bank re-
port in the spring of 2000 suggested that “the recent emphasis given by UNESCO and 
OHR to shared curriculum programs has lead to an increasing entrenchment of politi-
cal positions on this issue.”195 Unfortunately, this early recognition of the problem did 
not initially change the reform approach. 
 
It was easy for reformers to focus exclusively on these identity-focused issues. 
Among local actors, these issues are key to progress for the reformers and central to 
continued division among obstructionists. For outside reformers they are often the 
most obvious necessary changes, particularly to the non-educators. The need to purge 
a book of racial slurs and factual distortions is much easier to see than the need for 
modern teaching methods or a Standards and Assessment Agency.  
 
This is not to suggest that divisive and inflammable curricula and textbooks should be 
tolerated. Objectionable content must be removed with the support of progressive, 
reform-minded local or external actors (the Georg Eckert Institute and other textbook 
experts are involved in this process in BiH). Similarly, segregation in schools must be 
stopped if an integrated community is a future goal. In the absence of local authorities 
willing to make these changes, external pressure may be necessary, and intervening 
countries can use a combination of carrots and sticks to force compliance. In the case 
of BiH and other conflict regions, kin-states should also be pressured so that they do 
not support ongoing tensions beyond their borders.196 Textbooks from Zagreb and 
                                      
195 World Bank Project Appraisal Document, April 2000, 10.  
196 During the OSCE Permanent Council discussion on the education mandate, the Head of the Croatia 
delegation expressed support for reform, but insisted on respect for the constituent rights of all people 
in BiH and on “the active preservation of their national, political and religious identities”. OSCE Per-
manent Council Notes, July 2002. While this is a reasonable goal for a kin-state interested in protecting 
 
 
93
Belgrade cannot serve as the primary textbooks in BiH if BiH is to be a sovereign 
state, and locally published texts must meet professional standards of objectivity.  
 
Approaching educational reform from the standpoint of technical assistance and sys-
temic modernization, rather than just the revision of texts and curriculum, can provide 
an environment in which necessary steps can help to lay the ground for addressing the 
more controversial subjects in the future. Bringing experts together to discuss non-
political reform as professionals can provide a basis for future, more difficult work on 
issues of identity and history. 
 
A second lesson that is quite closely related to the first is that it is important not to 
confuse post-war and more general transitional reform agendas.197 The education re-
form agenda in BiH would have been necessary even in the absence of the war in the 
early 1990s. The multiple transitions BiH is facing necessitate a specially tailored 
approach that addresses all of BiH’s needs. Connecting educational reform with the 
IC’s exit strategy from its involvement in BiH’s post-war peace implementation fails 
to differentiate between the problems caused by the war and the problems that are a 
legacy of the old system.   
 
Third, a lesson demonstrated through the BiH experience is that committed educa-
tional reform needs committed and dedicated support. Until the OSCE received a 
mandate to work on this issue, the IC did not have a comprehensive idea of how to 
approach education and educational reform. More importantly, they did not know how 
to secure the needed resources to make changes. Without top-level leaders pushing for 
reform in any area, it will not be a priority.  
 
Addressing the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna on 4 July 2002, HR Paddy Ash-
down noted: “No organization in Bosnia and Herzegovina other than the OSCE has 
the mandate and therefore is in a position to take the lead on education.”198 It is unfor-
                                                                                                          
its people across borders, the assertion of one’s right to an identity must not detract from a state iden-
tity, or result in prejudices or lasting divisions. 
197 Personal interview, Hugh Glanville, Sarajevo, November 2002. 
198 “Bosnia High Representative Urges OSCE to take Lead on Education”, OSCE Press Release, 4 July 
2002.  
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tunate that it took six years for a statement of such force to be made. While the lack of 
centralized control of educational reform has its benefits and ensures that different 
organizations can utilize their various strengths and experiences, it also leaves open 
the possibility for redundancies or competing initiatives. An effective interagency 
framework and approach can seek to bring together unitary coordination with the 
skills and talents of multiple actors. Education and educational reform, together with 
more traditional democratization reform tasks, should therefore be viewed as a key 
part of peace agreements and state-building plans. Including educational reform as an 
integral part of peace-building and state-building will give the topic clout and force, 
enable the assignment of a mandate and make real reform much more likely than if 
treated as an ad hoc ‘option’. 
 
A fourth lesson is that a balance must be maintained between the external catalysts for 
reform on the one hand, and internal dynamics, participation and implementation on 
the other. Ideally, local actors will be dedicated to reform and will participate in the 
modernization process, with external support limited to technical training, funding 
and guidance. There is no doubt that local initiatives are better for long-term imple-
mentation and sustainability. Imposition of reforms from external forces is also incon-
sistent with the development and consolidation of a democracy. Even during the post-
WWII German occupation as the debate over the role of the occupiers and German 
citizens in the reform process continued, it was noted that: “Such an interference, even 
if the intention to democratize education is given for a reason, would be absolutely 
contradictory to the spirit of true democracy, destroy faith in democracy and, there-
fore, have an effect exactly contrary to its intended purpose.”199 In an ideal world, 
democracies will be built through democratic means. 
 
However, in the case of BiH and other post-conflict societies, the key question must 
be how to create the conditions for reform and how to marginalize and disenfranchise 
the spoilers who benefit from the status quo, obstruct progress and stoke the politics 
of fear and division. In virtually every society in conflict there exists a cadre of politi-
cians, criminals or military/paramilitary leaders who personally stand to gain from the 
spoils of continued conflict and division. Operating outside of the rule of law, one 
                                      
199 Tent,  Mission on the Rhine…, 155.  
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grenade thrown at a school, mosque or church can in minutes destroy the efforts taken 
over months or years to rebuild a community. If the spoilers can be marginalized and 
removed from the  reform arena, progress can begin. In weak states still struggling to 
build the institutions and procedures necessary for a democracy, external forces are 
often in a better position to marginalise such elites than internal actors. 
 
The case of Brčko is interesting in this respect. After the arbitration decision, spoilers 
claimed that riots and ethnic violence would spread throughout BiH. That did not 
happen. Throughout the demilitarization of the District in early 2000 spoilers claimed 
that security would be compromised and civil unrest would ensue. That did not hap-
pen. Upon the imposition and implementation of educational reform in 2001, politi-
cians claimed that they and ‘theirs’ would not succumb to multiethnic schools with 
‘the other’. To the contrary, the majority of people were willing to learn about the 
reforms and were comfortable enough with the changes to send their children to the 
newly reconstituted schools. Marginalizing the spoilers, whether through elections, 
removal from office or temporary establishment of a transitional authority, can pro-
vide space in which the peace and progress that the average people want can begin to 
take root.200 
 
A fifth lesson is that innovative solutions should be a key part of seeking reform and 
negotiating compromise. In response to Bosnian Croat concerns that they are being  
‘overshadowed’ as the smallest of the three constituent peoples in BiH and therefore 
need ‘their own’ university in Mostar, a possible suggestion could be the establish-
ment of an Institute of Croatian Studies. Other innovative solutions could be the 
establishment of a multicultural research centre, or in the case of BiH’s national 
minorities, the creation of an Institute for the Study of National Minorities to 
demonstrate commitment to full inclusion and multiethnicity and possibly even 
become a regional centre of scholarship. Such approaches would help to change the 
debate from being one framed as a win-lose issue, to one in which all parties see 
                                      
200 It has been noted, regarding education and other reform issues, that while there is often consensus 
by the politicians on the need for reform, there is a natural inclination among the political parties to not 
be seen agreeing with one another. In BiH, this can lead to a progression through contentious debate, 
stalemate, OHR imposition, public indignation by politicians for the media, and ultimately, quiet 
acceptance and implementation – a repeat of the ‘IC as arbiter’ role that was seen in the debate on 
constitutional reform. 
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one framed as a win-lose issue, to one in which all parties see themselves as gaining 
through reform. 
 
Sixth, initiatives that specifically and openly support the development of a culture of 
peace should be further studied and evaluated. Education for Peace’s project de-
scribed above, and other initiatives, such as UNESCO’s “Culture of Peace” concept 
and their Associated Schools programme, developed in the 1990s, can bring together 
students, parents, politicians and communities to ensure that education is a force for 
progress and development.201 Project DiaCom, organized by the US-based Karuna 
Center, seeks to bring educators from different parts of regions in conflict together to 
share experiences and understand how the war affected people in different ways, 
through open and shared conversations.202 It is important to emphasize that peace 
education and educational reform in general is needed in the entire Balkan region if it 
is to have a future impact on regional politics and development, as the area’s shared 
history will affect its common future.203  
 
Finally, regional considerations are needed more generally as education reform pro-
gresses in the entire space of the Balkans.204 This is particularly relevant to higher 
education.  Economies of scale dictate that it is not economically feasible for every 
country, let alone every region of every country, to support its own specialised facul-
ties or institutes. Medical faculties, technical institutes and schools of advanced busi-
ness studies should be developed on a regional level, so that high quality faculty and 
resources can be brought together to ensure a stronger standard of excellence rather 
than being cloistered in small provincial locations.  In addition to the immediate prac-
tical and economic benefits of such resource-sharing, a regional approach will provide 
students and faculty alike with exposure to people and ideas from throughout the re-
gion, and potentially attract scholars from Europe as well. 
 
                                      
201 See http://www.unesco.org/education/emergency/unesco/knowledge.shtml. The 1994 UNESCO 
International Conference on Education also addressed education for peace and the teaching of human 
rights and democracy.  
202 Arie Farnam, “The Hard Work of Getting Along”, The Christian Science Monitor, 14 August 2001. 
203 For an informative review of peace education in Serbia, see Ruzica Rosandić, “Grappling with 
Peace Education in Serbia”, US Institute of Peace, April 2000. 
204 Thanks to Hugh Glanville for his insight on this issue. 
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These lessons are not necessarily new, but because they are difficult and require a 
dedicated, proactive effort, they are in danger of being ignored in future post-conflict 
situations. Unfortunately, these efforts do not always receive the attention or resources 
they deserve from development agencies, as they are long-term in focus and impact 
and therefore cannot demonstrate concrete results in short six- to twelve-month con-
tractual timeframes. A more realistic approach to educational reform must ultimately 
be accompanied by a more realistic understanding of the long-term nature of peace-
building and democratisation processes, and of the substantive differences between 
the reconstruction of bricks and mortar and the gradual transformation of mindsets, 
perceptions and beliefs. 
 
As noted earlier in this report, the problem in BiH was never lack of understanding of 
the problem or potential solutions, but lack of will – among the BiH authorities to 
relinquish national agendas in exchange for reform and among the countries that 
comprise the international community to become involved in such a difficult process. 
Rather than being disregarded as a ‘soft’ topic, education should be viewed as a prior-
ity in post-conflict societies because of the direct impact that education has not only 
on peace-building, but on economic growth and development. The link between edu-
cation and the economy in BiH is seen both in today’s all-too-real ‘brain-drain’ of 
tomorrow’s potential entrepreneurs. A strong state cannot exist with a weak economy, 
and education and the economic benefits of education must be viewed as aspects of a 
country’s security and stability. 
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VII. Conclusions 
This report provides only an overview of the issues involved in this complex topic, 
and there continues to be a real need for future research. There are numerous other 
areas of research that could contribute to greater understanding of educational reform 
in BiH, such as educational reform in Kosovo, Serbia or Croatia, or specific studies of 
the state of reform in BiH cities such as Mostar, Banja Luka or Sarajevo. It would 
prove interesting to follow one or two schools in BiH as they reform over several 
years to determine which processes work and how local solutions are developed.205 
In-depth studies of the attitudes and perceptions of students, teachers and parents in 
these schools could contribute to our understanding of the impact of education on 
post-conflict opinions. More research on the quality of university and vocational edu-
cation reform, with a focus on student outcome and professional placement, would 
also be interesting topics for future research, and could strengthen understanding of 
the link between post-conflict education and economic development. 
 
It is likely that primary and secondary education reform will continue to command 
attention in BiH and elsewhere as it impacts the largest number of people and reaches 
into every home with school-age children. Although there have been several success-
ful reforms, as evidenced by the OSCE’s best practice reference guide, and although 
policy changes are gradually being adopted, there are still many challenges ahead.  
 
One of the most important steps facing BiH will be the adoption and implementation 
of harmonized legislation and curriculum at all levels of government. The adoption of 
the state-level framework law is an important first step. However, while harmoniza-
tion is necessary to ensure progress and cohesion as a state, the goals of quality educa-
tional reform and the IC’s effort to strengthen BiH’s state-level institutions should not 
be confused. For instance, except for the economic costs of parallelism, it is not inevi-
table that BiH should have a single Ministry of Education.206 As in many aspects of 
political life in BiH, education will likely remain decentralized. Strong opposition 
                                      
205 Melita Čukur of the Department of Social Anthropology at Göteborg University in Sweden has 
studied issues of education and national identities in Sarajevo and central Bosnia in 2001. Further work 
in these and other areas could greatly increase understanding of this issue in post-conflict societies. 
206 Federal states such as the United States and Germany have decentralized education systems. Minis-
ters from both Belgium’s French and Flemish communities have signed the Bologna Declaration. See 
http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/education/socrates/erasmus/bologna.pdf. 
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remains among politicians and Bosnian Serb citizens in the RS against the creation of 
state-level institutions and laws not mandated by Dayton, as such moves are seen as a 
threat to the existence of the RS entity itself.207 In contrast to competencies such as 
defence and security, however, which are traditionally associated with a state, the 
educational system in BiH can still be a largely decentralized system as long it ad-
heres to harmonized standards, provides equal educational access and opportunities to 
all and is accountable to every level of government and the citizenry as a whole.  
While a state-level Ministry of Education may not be in the country’s short or long-
term future, harmonized principles can be applied at the state level and implemented 
at the entity and cantonal levels. A 1999 COE/World Bank report acknowledged this, 
noting: “Ultimately, the long run goal for education in BiH will almost inevitably be a 
decentralized education system where primary control over education inputs – curric-
ula, books, teacher training, etc. – is taken at lower levels of the system, as is the trend 
in many Western European countries today.”208 
 
Additionally, the instinct to support reconciliation should not lead to the development 
of new mono-perspective histories to replace the old mono-perspective histories. 
Students will be best served by a learning environment in which they are encouraged 
to analyze and criticize the facts themselves and one in which they learn that single 
events can have many different interpretations. The mono-perspective approach to 
learning used in Yugoslavia did not help to create a population of critical thinkers, but 
instead fostered an environment of competing mono-perspectives, where there was 
little view for different views or interpretations: “Scripturalism must give way to 
democratic methods and multiple viewpoints. Tolerance might be encouraged if 
pupils came to understand that the same story could be told in different ways, and that 
some of those who would tell it differently could be their next-door neighbors.”209 
While texts promoting hatred should not be tolerated, an appreciation for the nuances 
of history and culture could help BiH’s civil society and democracy to mature. 
 
                                      
207 There is also strong opposition against development of a state-level Ministry of Defence, a state-
level customs agency and other proposals to centralize powers in state-level bodies. 
208 Education in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Governance, Finance and Administration, 4. 
209 Donia, The Quest for Tolerance.  
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A 1999 World Bank/EC report admits that these changes will not occur quickly: “It 
will take time before parties to the conflict accept the role education can and should 
play in promoting reconciliation.”210 The people of BiH must grow to recognize the 
need for these changes and must demonstrate to politicians that they are tired of pay-
ing for parallel, inefficient systems that offer a sub-standard quality education.  
The ultimate success of educational reform in BiH unfortunately cannot be separated 
from the larger political issues and uncertainties in BiH and in the region. Continuing 
internal and external debates on the political structures in BiH and regional border 
issues continue to breed uncertainty among supporters and opponents alike. BiH’s 
future will be tied to the extent to which a person’s cultural and political/civic identi-
ties can be held as two distinctive parts of one’s overall identity; with cultural loyal-
ties and traditions directed towards one’s culture or religion, and one’s political and 
civic loyalty placed in the state of BiH.211 The success of educational reform in BiH 
will in large part reflect the extent to which education serves as a building block for a 
common citizenship and shared experience, so the country that can be successfully 
integrated into European and global structures.  
                                      
210 Prepared for the May 1999 Donor’s Conference co-hosted by the European Commission and the 
World Bank. 
211 This is similar to the problem facing Greek and Turkish Cypriots. See Maria Hadjupavlou-
Trigeorgis, A Partnership Between Peace Education…, passim.  
